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Issues in policy for agriculture and agricultural marketing are always in 
flux. 
The UMC-Perry Foundation seminar reported in these pages was held to bring 
into focus a range of ideas for future policy directions for U. S. agriculture. 
Under terms of agreement between the Perry Foundation and the University 
of Missouri an annual seminar is to be held "to promote the development of 
information relative to the socio-economic forces that bear on the welfare of 
family operated farms and ranches, and upon the income to those operators; to 
disseminate that information widely among agricultural leaders of the nation; 
and to provide a forum ••• for discussion ••• by leaders of organizations, 
institutions, and legislators." 
The Perry Foundation was established in Robstown, Tex., in 1946 as a 
memorial to members of the Perry family who did much for the agriculture of 
South Texas. It both sponsors and carries on research in agriculture. The 
Foundation is dedi.cated to working toward a prosperous agriculture and the 
welfare of the people on the land. 
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SUMMARY 
Harold F. Breilllyer 
Departillent 0/ Agrim!t/{ral Econoillics 
Unit'ersity 0/ MiJSrmri 
The kaleidoscope of thinking on what agricultural 
policy should be was revealed once again in the variety of 
ideas presented at the University of Missouri - Perry Foun-
dation seminar in agricultural marketing and policy held 
October 8-9, 1973, at Columbia, Missouri . 
The four principal speakers and the several panels and 
discussion groups presented a wealth of commentary on 
policy for agriculture. 
A few themes recurred often. They reappeared fre-
quently enough that they may be called central issues . 
Some are fairly new to policy debates . Others were of older 
vintage but were given such a new twist as scarcely to be 
recognizable. 
The policy scene is indeed changing. 
The summary of central ideas that follows is taken 
from both the principal addresses and the more formal 
(but not the informal) discussions . 
Rural Fundamentalism -
With A Fossil Fuel Dimension 
There is something fundamental about the rural 
scene. This old faith was given new expression, against 
two backdrops: the view of a nation (and world) trying to 
spend itself into prosperity, and the reminder that 
modern farming depends heavily on fossil fuels as a stock 
resource. 
Arnold Paulson put it that "all new wealth comes 
from nature in the form of raw material production." 
Harold Breimyer chose the words that "economic 
strength is rooted in real productiveness and not in fiscal 
manipulation. " 
Paulson stressed this theme as reason to give adequate 
income to raw material producers. He insisted that many 
governments, instead of doing that, are paying out dollars 
at the other end - to subsidize demand. In the process 
they create an ever-spiraling debt . This viewpoint is vir-
5 
tually the same as Breimyer's comment on trying to solve 
our economic problems by "fiscal measures to sustain 
dollar income." The consequence is an artificial prosperity 
- and inflation. 
Omitting the phraseology, this strips down to the 
idea that basic resources count most and any nation dis-
regards them at its peril and to its eventual regret. 
But that familiar axiom was revised, and older faiths 
in rural fundamentalism were recast, by the recognition 
of how much modern farming depends on industrial re-
sources, including fossil fuels. The supply of those fuels 
and other stock resources is becoming tighter. 
Breimyer: "Gains [in agricultural productivity] have 
corne largely from drawing on ever-increasing quantities 
of resources of industrial origin . . . [Those] resources 
made available to farming will not be as plentiful in the 
future as in the past." Philip Raup : "To an important 
degree, the critical resource in United States agriculture 
is no longer land but minerals. " Further, "until well into 
the twentieth century almost all of our food supply carne 
from flow resources derived from solar energy . Today a 
large and rapidly increasing share of our food supply 
comes from stock resources , primarily petroleum, coal 
and minerals." "Recognition that this stock is limited" is 
a source of much concern. 
A variation on this theme began with the of ten-
quoted numbers on how many consumers each farmer 
supports. Sometimes the figure named is as high as 48 or 
50, said Paulson, who then added, "This is not true and it 
never has been true. We've gOt the greatest farmers in the 
world, but they're not that good. One farmer today, with 
the help of35 other people in town, can feed 48 people." 
Food production is a joint enterprise. 
Farmers' Minority Stams 
Are farmers handicapped because they are few? Said 
Raup, yes, but also because they produce a surplus . 
"Farmers are no longer a major political force, " he de-
clared . He added that U . S. farmers are hurt more by their 
minority status than European farmers are, and then ex-
plained that Europe is food deficit and therefore solicitOus 
of the strength of its agriculture. The U. S., by contrast, 
is food surplus . 
The inference is that if less available industrial re-
sources keep U. S. farm production from overflowing (the 
Breimyer thesis), farmers as a minority will gain standing 
and strength . 
Bottum distinguished between raw power and ef-
fectiveness. Like Raup he believes that "agriculture no 
longer has the political muscle to pass just what it wants. " 
He added that "agricultural legislation is going to have to 
appear creditable to the non-farm groups in the future ." 
But he is sure that agriculture has good standing in both 
the Congress and our cities. "There still is a reservoir of 
good will toward farmers. " 
It is often said that divisions among farmers do more 
harm than the farmers ' lack of numbers. Raup observed , 
"There is not one agriculture but many agricultures." He 
noted a widening gap within farming between the few 
large farms and the many small ones. We may be "wit-
nessing the development of a dual economic structure in 
American agriculture ." "The voting strength in agricul-
ture is at the low end of the income scale while the eco-
nomic strength is at the upper end ." 
Structural Organization of Agriculture 
Who is going to own and control farming? This 
question was woven like a thread throughout the con-
ference . Most persons present agreed with Paulson that 
family farmers can survive if the test be efficiency. Paulson 
was the most pessimistic about holding on to family farm-
ing, foreseeing a "feudal system" with all farmers becom-
ing tenants . 
Bottum predicted that "legislation bearing on who is 
going to control agriculture will be a continuing is-
sue. . . This legislation will deal particularly with the 
maintenance of open markets and with federal income 
tax policies. . . ." 
Raup spoke of how farm programs help large farmers 
more than small. He pointed out that our method of tax-
ing capital gains has created "an incentive. . . for 
wealthy investors or large firms to buy land on credit, and 
farm it while holding it in anticipation both of income 
from annual operation and from ultimate liquidation 
. . ." He also mentioned the cash accounting privilege, 
particularly as a hidden subsidy for livestock production 
(particularly cattle feeding) with high-tax-bracket capi-
tal. The subsidy hurts small livestock farmers and feeders, 
he said. 
W. E. Hamilton, on the other hand, pointed out that 
tax sheltered feeding operations provided good markets 
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for feeder cattle producers and others. Farmers are not of a 
single mind on the tax shelter subject, he declared. 
Marshall Harris claimed that who will control agri-
culture is the "greatest single question for agriculture ." 
He favors retaining a decentralized , family farming . 
However, this would not be the status quo preserved . 
On the contrary, he asks that we " use the ingenuity we 
have to develop a new business form for farming. " He 
considers a franchise system as one possibility . 
Still another consideration is that nonf.'lrm demand for 
land, often for economic purposes but sometimes only 
for hobby and recreation uses , competes with farmers' 
demand for land to farm . Even if farmers are able to retalO 
or buy their land, the price is bid up to a point where they 
cannot realize normal returns on it. 
Can Farmers Stand Prosperity? 
A novel idea came into the conference when the ques-
tion was raised as to whether the higher farm incomes of 
1973 will prove , as Raup put it , "a benefit or a disaster for 
family farmers. " 
Raup commented that there was little interest in buy-
ing out family farmers when their incomes were low . But 
now that farming is more profitable we can expect an 
" influx of non-farm capital." The income tax rules, he 
added, make that investment even more attractive . 
Paulson raised no such question. He favors keeping 
incomes at an improved level , as both reward and in-
centive for abundant production. His argument, how-
ever, is based on a more general proposition that unless 
the value of anything that is produced is returned to the 
producer, a deficiency in demand is created . The essence 
of Paulson's philosophy, and his message to the seminar, 
lies in this sentence: "We must have income equal to the 
cost of production so that we can buy and exchange it 
with one another, and if not, we'll eventually monetize so 
much debt that we bankrupt the system." 
Vincent Rossiter likewise declared his confidence that 
improved returns would strengthen family farm agricul-
ture, and not jeopardize it. 
Consequences of Fuel Shortages 
Tlie changing situation with regard to fossil fuels 
received much attention . With regard to effect on future 
production, Bottum believes that more wheat and feed 
grains will eventually be produced than the market will 
take at target prices. Breimyer and Raup were more 
guarded, believing that farm production will be held 
down materially by higher prices of fuel and fertilizer. 
Raup carried his viewpoint to two further con-
sequences . One relates, once more, to the structure of 
agriculture. Cheap energy, he said, has contributed to 
large and specialized farms. Therefore, higher priced 
energy might be a factor favoring family farms . His 
second observation raises a kind of question about agri-
cultural exports that is not heard often. If we must import 
petroleum to produce cottOn , feed grains, and soybeans, 
how long will it continue economic for the U. S. to ex-
port those commodities? "How durable," he asks, " .. . 
is our present comparative advantage in export markets 
for farm products?" 
The Prospective Supply-Demand Balance 
Fred Heinkel early posed "food and fuel" as " the 
focal issues of the 70's." As noted above, fuel prospects 
(including nitrogen fertilizer) were generally seen as hold-
ing farm production down to some degree . 
Raup and Breimyer declared that structural changes 
in farming also are tending to restrain production, as some 
of the newer entrants are under no pressure to intensify. 
Even established crop-and-livestock farmers, they added, 
may respond to higher prices received from crops by cut-
ting back or even dropping their time-consuming live-
stock enterprises. 
Breimyer drew an inference that if family farmers do 
not choose to produce livestock and poultry , "the door 
will be left wide open for an expansion of factory-type 
operations. Separating feed production and livestock 
production further would have a great deal of meaning to 
the future structure of agriculture." 
Hallberg gave a measure of suppOrt to this view 
when he declared the declining trend in milk production 
to be a matter of concern. 
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Breimyer summed the conservative outlook for farm 
production in words that "U. S. agriculture will not 
suddenly resume such an out-pouring of crop and lives-
stock produces as to overwhelm U. S. and world mar-
kets .. .. Henceforth, surpluses will be episodic, not 
continuous. And they are more likely to show up in crop 
products than livestock." 
Not all persons attending the seminar, however, were 
convinced of this prospect. A number feared a return of 
surpluses after a year or two. Bottum, as previously stat-
ed, shared some concern regarding the grains. But it is 
significant that this seminar on agricultural marketing 
and policy, unlike similar meetings in previous years, was 
not conducted in an atmosphere of preoccupation with 
surpluses. 
Among other topics discussed during the seminar was 
the perennial one of rural development . Said Bottum, 
"Rural development will be a continuing issue. There are 
many valid reasons for not continuing to shift more and 
more of our rural population to the larger cities." 
Foreign trade, transportation (the box car shortage!) 
and still other subjects did not lack for spokesmen. But 
the prevailing theme, as explained above, concerned what 
kind of future lies ahead as agriculture, a basic producer 
of raw materials for the economy, is subjected to pressures 
of less accessible industrial inputs, tax-induced and other 
structural changes, an ever-declining minority status, and 
fiscal policies undertaken by governments everywhere 
that have so much effect on farmers' incomes and welfare. 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,AND POLITICAL FORCES THAT WILL BEAR 
UPON U. S. AGRICULTURE AND WELFARE OF FARMERS 
IN YEARS AHEAD 
Philip M. Raup 
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics 
University of Minnesota 
Farmers in the united States and in most developed countries have been 
forced to recognize since the mid-twentieth century that they are a minority 
group. Their statistical position had been clear at least a generation earlier 
but in economic, social, and certainly in political dimensions, statistics did 
not tell the true story. Recognition of the minority status of farming has 
been variously resisted. It has forced itself upon industrialized countries 
at critical moments in their histories, going far back into the nineteenth 
century in the case of England and several smaller countries (switzerland, 
Belgium, Luxemburg). In the United States, farming, forestry, and fishing 
employed half the labor force as late as 1880, and it was 1920 before employed 
workers in manufacturing and the building trades outnumbered those in agri-
culture. The percentage of the population employed in U. S. agriculture at 
the outbreak of the Second World War was approximately the same as it had been 
in Great Britain one hundred years earlier (22.7 per cent, in 1841). 
Acceptance of minority status has been much easier, of course, for farmers 
in densely settled countries dependent upon imports for a major share of their 
food supply. The strategic value of a domestic food supply in wartime 
guaranteed economic support for twentieth century agriculture in the united 
Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland, for example, that has been far beyond any 
attention their farmers could command by weight of numbers or voting strength. 
And their minority status in a political and social sense has been moderated 
by a knowledge that they were an essential element in national survival through 
two World Wars. 
The situation in the united States is sharply different. Here the 
implications of minority status have been forced to the attention of a farm 
population that has not only maintained the position of the United States as 
a net agricultural exporter, but increased it after the farm labor force had 
fallen below five per cent of the gainfully employed. The United States is 
the first major food exporting country to face the adaptations required of a 
nation in which farmers are no longer a major political force. 
This is a necessary prelude to an understanding of many of the economic, 
social and political forces that will shape U. S. agriculture in the years 
ahead. In examining these forces in this seminar, it is important to 
remember that my crystal ball is no clearer than yours. The points I will 
make are advanced with much uncertainty. I will raise more questions than I 
can answer. They will be designed to stimulate discussion, and to provide an 
outline that can focus that discussion on at least some of the critical issues. 
I propose to look first at some elements of change that have direct ef-
fects on the farming business. In terms of both immediate impacts and long 
run implications, the most insistent issue concerns the question of energy. 
1 I' , Co ~n Clark, The Cond~tions of Economic Progress, London, Macmillan, 
1940, pp. 185, 187. 
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We practice "cheap fuel" farming in the United states, and have done so 
throughout bur history of agricultural mechanization. This is a reflection of 
our resource endowment, and the geographic accident that has located petroleum 
supplies in proximity to major farming regions. It is also a reflection of our 
institutional structure, and especially our tax system. 
To the extent that state and federal taxes have raised the price of non-
farm motor fuels there has been some price-induced restraint in their use. 
This restraint is lacking for fuels used in farming. 
Most of our states have constitutional or legislative prohibitions on the 
use of motor vehicle taxes for any purpose other than highway building, polic-
ing, and maintenance. This applies especially to taxes on motor fuels. One 
consequence has been to inhibit any taxation of motor fuels used in farming. 
To do so would raise serious questions about the propriety of taxing farm fuels 
for general revenue purposes, while motor fuels used in highway travel are tax-
ed only for highway purposes. As a result, farm fuels go untaxed. 
The dedication of all highway fuel taxes to highway purposes has thus 
worked to insulate farm fuels from any cost increases reflecting higher rates 
of taxation. The cost ratio of farm fuels to non-farm motor fuels has fallen 
steadily over the past half century, reflecting the rise in highway motor fuel 
taxes. The decline was especially marked after the introduction of federal 
taxes to finance the interstate highway program in 1956. 
For example, from 1940 to 1960 the composite average state and federal 
gasoline tax doubled, from approximately 5 cents to 10 cents per gallon. 2 
This had no effect upon the price of farm fuels, except to make them cheaper 
relative to non-farm fuels. 
Farm fuels have not only been cheap relative to non-farm motor fuels, but 
their relative share in farm production costs has been falling. This has un-
doubtedly influenced farmer decisions regarding mechanization, the number of 
motors used, size of motors, and intensity of use. 
Total expenditures on farm fuels have also declined as a fraction of 
total cash farm operating expenses, and especially so in recent years. Cash 
outlays on gas, oil, and grease in the southeast Farm Management Association 
farms in Minnesota, for example, were 7.4 percent of total cash operating 
expense in 1960, 6.2 per cent in 1965, and 4.7 per cent in 1972. In the South-
west Association~ the comparable percentages were 4.5 in 1960, 4.4 in 1965, 
and 2.7 in 1972. 
For many farms, fuel has become a minor cost item. Its decline in 
relative cost outlay has fostered a cheap fuel image. We have as a result an 
agricultural production structure that is based on the relatively lavish use 
of fuel, in which cash outlays for fuel have been overwhelmed by the rapid ex-
pansion in other cash farm operating expenses. 
united states agriculture is thus ill-equipped to face petroleum fuel 
shortages. Because farm fuel prices have not included the substantial taxes 
dedicated to highway expenditures, any increase in basic fuel costs will have 
a larger percentage impact on farmers than on highway users. It seems probable 
that the half-century decline in the relative cost of petroleum fuels in agri-
culture will be reversed. 
2statistical Abstract of the united States, 1961, p. 554. 
3 Annual Reports, Southeast and Southwest Farm Management Associations, 
1960-1972, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of 
Minnesota. The lower percentages in the Southwest are due to the larger role 
played by feeder cattle purchases in total farm operating expenses in that 
region. 
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If this occurs, we can expect a continuing farm fuel problem, and 
especially in the political arenao Price rises in fuel costs will be painful, 
but relative farm outlays for fuel are not large enough to insure that price 
increases will achieve economy in fuel use. If farm fuel prices had been 
doubled in Southern Minnesota in 1972, for example, fuel expenditures would 
still have been only about 7 per cent of total cash farm operating expenses. 
This suggests that price policy alone may be inadequate to deal with a 
shortage of petroleum fuels for farming. It must be reckoned a possibility 
that widespread fuel rationing for agriculture may be needed in the years 
immediately ahead. 
This is the short-run prospect. The longer run agricultural prospect 
raises issues that go to the heart of the world-wide energy problem. There 
are farmers alive and farming today who have witnessed in their lifetimes the 
transformation of agriculture from an activity based on a flow of solar energy 
converted through crops and animals to one based on a stock of fossil fuels. 
This is true both for energy used for motive power and energy in the form of 
fertilizer and agricultural chemicals. We have an agricultural production 
plant that is almost wholly dependent on an exhaustible resource. 
This can only be an transitional phenomenon. Although world wide stocks 
of fossil fuels are large and many more may be discovered, the international 
movement of these fuels raises problems of national dependence on trade, 
balance of payments, and monetary policy that are new in history. In the past, 
some nations could fear for their food supplies in time of war or blockade. 
But even England in the darkest days of the. Second World War could reckon on 
her coal for a basic energy supply that could sustain her. 
It is a different world today. Every major industrial nation is a net 
importer of petroleum fuels. Even the Soviet union with its vast and untapped 
resources is a net importer. Recognition of the consequences of this form of 
fuel dependency has been unavoidable in oil-poor nations such as the united 
Kingdom, Japan, Italy, the two Germanies, and France. It has come suddenly 
to the united States, and the shock has been great. We do not even have 
statistics readily available to measure the degree of this dependency, and its 
consequences for domestic and foreign policy. 
One question emerges with unexpected importance. How long will it remain 
economk for the united States to import petroleum for fuels and fertilizers 
to produce cotton, feed grains and soybeans for export in order to earn the 
money needed to pay for the petroleum imports? How durable, in other words, 
is our present comparative advantage in export markets for farm products? 
At the moment this seems to be a ridiculous question. We can export 
everything we have for sale at prices undreamed of even twelve months ago. 
But it is a question that must be asked. Potentials for the improvement of 
agricultural productivity in the rest of the world are great, and especially 
so in the Soviet Union. The foreign markets that have generated the current 
euphoria in united States agriculture could prove to be transitory. And if 
the problem of farm surpluses returns it will be in a new dimension. The 
conservation of energy supplies will be an added and insistent consideration 
in any future farm programs that seek to manage surplus farm output. 
If a management problem of this type arises, it will be resolved in a 
changed political climate. An agricultural production plant producing surplus-
es in competition with householders and motorists for energy supplies will face 
political opposition of a new kind. Should this occur, it seems probable 
that agriculture will be subjected to production planning and supply control 
measures that will be much more demanding than anything we have known in the 
past. 
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programs of food aid to developing nations will undoubtedly feel a major 
part of the force of any rise in the real cost of energy. It is one thing to 
sell cheaply or to give away food surpluses produced with domestic resources. 
It is quite a different matter if these food surpluses must be produced with 
imported fuels and chemicals. I conclude that the part of the energy crisis 
in the united States that involves petroleum will have an especially heavy 
impact on international aid programs. 
Cheap energy has also contributed to structural changes in agriculture 
that result in large and specialized farms. The impact of this change is 
especially heavy in the feed-livestock sector. And it has consequences for 
price and market policy that we are only beginning to perceive. 
A major source of past imbalance in American agriculture has been the 
long-standing differential between labor rewards in crop farming and in live-
stock production. As long as mixed or diversified farming predominated, the 
farm family could increase family income by care of livestock, although labor 
returns per hour were often quite low. 
One consequence of the expanding size of farms is that the farm family is 
less likely to be compelled to include a livestock enterprise in order to meet 
a target family income level. If this income level can be achieved with cash 
crops alone, there may be little compulsion for the family to commit its labor 
and its time-schedule to the demanding care of livestock. 
This is especially true if the farm is very large and must depend on a 
significant amount of hired labor. The livestock sector of family farm agri-
culture is still less mechanized than the crop sector, and the quality of labor 
required for successful livestock rearing is frequently not available in the 
farm labor market. 
The recent behavior of many family-type farmers in the Middle West 
suggests that they do have a target family income in mind, at least in the 
short run. Many family farmers that once included a substantial livestock 
enterprise in their total farm operation have now eliminated the livestock, 
and produce only cash grain. 
This trend has reduced both t~e number and the proportion of farmers who 
find a given increase in the price of a livestock product to be an adequate 
incentive for increased output. In the past, a farmer growing his own feed 
could follow the traditional calculations involved in the hog-corn or beef-
corn ratios in deciding whether to sell his corn or feed it. These were open 
options, and he could expand or contract his livestock operation relatively 
quickly. 
For many corn growers today, this option is not available. They have 
liquidated their hog or beef-feeding enterprises, have no adequate equipment 
for livestock feeding, and have organized their family time schedules around 
a cash grain operation with its less insistent daily time commitment. 
The price signals needed to secure a given production response are no 
longer adequately measured by the traditional hog-feed, dairy-feed, or beef-
feed price ratios. Imbedded in those traditional ratios were assumed cost 
components that reflected underemployed family labor, an unmet family income 
target, and the existence of some unused production-plant capacity in the form 
of farm buildings, equipment, water systems, etc. 
These assumptions no longer hold. A large cash grain farm can meet the 
family income target. More opportunities are available for the employment of 
farm women. Children remain in school to older ages, go farther from home for 
schooling, and seek urban instead of farm employment. There has been a change 
in farm life styles. 
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This is nowhere more evident than in the growth of off-farm employment 
for farmers. The average farm operator family in 1972 received half of its 
income from non-farm jobs or investments. For farms with gross sales of 
$5,000 to $9,999, off farm income exceeded farm income by 58 percent. In 
commercial farms with gross sales of $2,500 to $4,999, off-farm income was 
over three times as large as farm income. The majority of the farming 
population today does not look to farming for its major source of income. 4 
As a result, we may be witnessing a fundamental change in the reaction of 
farmers to fluctuations in agricultural product prices. Price changes may 
need to persist over longer periods of time before they elicit a supply 
response. And when it comes, it may be more massive than the same relative 
price change would have triggered a generation earlier. Larger, more special-
ized farms involve heavy capital commitments and elaborate organizational 
planning. It takes time to set them in production. And once in production 
they will tend to continue to produce at a given rate in spite of price 
changes that would have resulted in expansion or cut-backs in a population of 
family-farm producers. 
This is one aspect of scale of operation and degree of specialization 
that we have not studied adequately. In other fields of agricultural 
production where large-scale enterprises have predominated, there is evidence 
to suggest that large scale firms do not alter production schedules in 
response to price changes, except under sustained economic pressure. This 
has been reported for rubber in Malaysia, sugar in the Caribbean and pineapple 
in Hawaii. 5 If production involves a mix of large and small firms, the effect 
is to shift the short-run burden of output adjustment in response to price to 
the smaller firms. 
We may be entering this phase, in the evolution of united states agri-
culture. Farm product prices have changed drastically in recent months, and 
output response has been sluggish in the livestock sector. Many reasons 
account for this lag in response, not least the wildly fluctuating prices of 
feedstuffs which make long-range livestock production planning highly un-
certain. But it seems likely that one reason is that a basic change has taken 
place in the structure of agriculture. The result is a production pattern that 
could lengthen the supply response cycle in livestock products, increase the 
amplitude of its movements, and result in immobility in supply over relatively 
long time periods. The agricultural output curve for livestock products, in 
short, may come to resemble that of the steel industry. 
This shift out of livestock has been building up over four decades. with 
the exception of 1940 and 1946, we have been net importers of meat for nearly 
40 years. Domestic milk production is declining and we may well be entering 
into a production phase in which we will be net importers of dairy products, 
on an increasing scale. 
We are beginning to exhibit the production characteristics of some 
developing countries in which large land holdings and very small farms exist 
in a symbiotic relationship. The big farms do not produce livestock products 
because labor requirements, market risks and price levels do not encourage it. 
Cash cropping is the rule on big farms. The little farms are limited in their 
capacity to produce livestock products because they are too small to support 
4 
u. s. Census, 1970, "Income of the Farm Related Population," Series PC 
(2)-8C, Washington, D. C., U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1973, and Farm Income 
situation, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, FIS-222, July 1973. 
5C. R. Wharton, Jr., "Marketing, Merchandising and Moneylending: A Note 
on Middlemen Monopsony in Malaya". Malayan Economic Review, Vol. VII, No.2, 
October, 1962, pp. 24-44; George- -Beckford, Persistent Poverty, London, Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1972. 
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risk-taking and management skills on the scale needed. As a result, livestock 
production is stunted, and unresponsive to price. In the European version of 
this relationship between scale of enterprise and output mix it has been 
difficult to secure an increase in meat production, especially beef, because 
the farms are so small. 
In the American version, we may demonstrate the reverse proposition. It 
may become increasingly difficult and expensive to gain the increases we need 
in meat and milk output because our farms are so large. 
In a wider sense, this is the way food shortages on a world wide scale 
will be reflected in our domestic price levels and consumption patterns. Grain 
can be stored and shipped long distances at low cost. The revolution in ocean 
transport costs brought about by the giant oil tankers (which can also carry 
grain) has cheapened the cost of grain imports for food deficit areas. 
Grain prices have risen relative to livestock product prices. The grain 
surplus that for the past two decades had stayed on farms or in the storage 
bins of the CCC held down market prices and gave us cheap domestic livestock 
feed prices. This grain surplus is gone. Domestic meat consumers must bid 
against world market grain prices for the feed required to increase meat 
supplies. The world demand for more grain is being converted into a restructur-
ing of our domestic output mix of agricultural products. 
One of the most persistent and visible trends in united states agriculture 
has been the continuing increase in size and decline in number of farms since 
the Second World War. In crude terms, the number of farms was cut in half 
from 1950 to 1973, and average size doubled. These data are defective in that 
changes in the definition of a farm have taken place on several occasions since 
1950. The 5,648,000 farms enumerated by the census in 1950, for example, 
included a number of small farms in size classes that are excluded in the 
estimate of 2,831,000 farms for 1973. Although the degree of decline in number 
of farms is overstated, the magnitude of the increase in average farm size is 
not significantly disturbed by this correction. 
As we have seen, a part of the explanation for this increase can be traced 
to the relatively low cost of energy in agriculture which has encouraged the 
substitution of machine power for human and animal power. This trend has been 
accelerated by a continuous decline in the cost of maChinery and equipment 
relative to labor. And in recent decades the trend has been heavily influenced 
by peculiarities in the institutional structure affecting farm price support 
programs, credit programs, and tax policies. TWo of these peculiarities merit 
closer examination. 
Since price support programs have in the past been tied to crop acreage 
or production history, the size of any government payments to individual farmers 
has had a direct and linear relation to volume of production. In sharp con-
trast, by underwriting a relative degree of farm price stability the federal 
government has had an influence on the risk expectations of farms in different 
farm size classes that is not linear. A historic limitation on large scale 
farming activities has always been the indeterminate nature of large risks. 
In agriculture these involve both market price risks and climatic and biologic 
risks. By reducing substantially the risk of market price collapse, the net 
effect of government farm price support programs has been to make farm invest-
ments relatively more attractive to large scale investors than to small scale 
investors or family type farmers. Large scale farmers have been encouraged to 
use venture capital more effectively than is possible for small entrepreneurs. 
Capacity to make use of financial "leverage" is in general unavailable to 
family type farmers. This becomes increasingly important as size of farm 
expands, permitting a given proportionate increase in equity capital to finance 
a much larger increase in total business activity. 
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This in turn has been a consequence of the peculiar nature of united 
states accounting practices and tax policy with respect to the taxation of in-
come, and particularly income from capital gains. Since interest on borrowed 
capital is a business ex pense in computing income tax liability, those enter-
prises with adequate borrowing power and large incomes can shift from the use 
of equity capital to the use of borrowed capital to advantage. The net effect 
is to reduce the cost of capital to the large firm. This opportunity is 
either unavailable orof minor significance for family type enterprises. 
The resulting stimulus to the expansion of the farm business has been 
given further impetus by our method of taxing capital gains. Up to 1969 this 
tax was levied at a rate of never more than 25% of the realized capital gain. 
Since tax liability on earned income can rise to a 50% rate on taxable incomes 
of $38,000, there has been a substantial reward to high-income taxpayers 
for the conversion of earned income into capital gain. Some reduction in 
this incentive was achieved by the tax reform act of 1969, which provided for 
an increase in the capital gains tax liability from 25% to 35% when income 
from capital gains exceeds $50,000 in a tax year. This rate increase has been 
relatively small compared to the reward that could be achieved by realizing 
income in the form of capital gain, never to be taxed at more than 35%, while 
income from wages and salaries could be taxed at rates up to 50%. 
As a consequence, an incentive condition has been created for wealthy 
investors or large firms to buy land on credit, and farm it while holding it 
in anticipation both of income from annual operation and from ultimate 
liquidation, through the differential savings made possible by the capital 
gains tax structure. 
The development of corporation and large scale farming in the last 20 
years has been heavily influenced by these trends. They introduced an element 
of institutional bias into a structure of cost and returns based on convention-
al farm operating practices that has greatly accelerated the trend toward larger 
farms. To put the matter in other terms, the farm size structure that we have 
today is in part a consequence of ex panding technology, and of economies of 
size resulting from the rising cost of labor relative to the cost of capital. 
But this fails to tell the whole story. A major part of the reason for the 
continuing expansion of farm size is our institutional structure, particularly 
our tax system and the past twenty years of farm price support programs. 
The farm price support program has been changed but the tax inequity 
remains. We tax income from property at never more than 35% when realized in 
the form of capital gain. We put a penalty tax on income from wages and 
salaries that rises above the 25% marginal rate when income goes above $12,000 
for a married tax payer filing a joint return. It rises above the 35% 
marginal rate when family income goes above $24,000. Put in other terms, for 
family taxable incomes above $12,000 our tax system gives an increasing reward 
to income from property over income from labor. This has insured that the 
operation of the land market will transfer real property over time from the 
hands of those with low incomes to the hands of those with high incomes. 
This trend is clearly underway in American agriculture today. 
Another dimension of the problem is even more puzzling. It has been a 
major article of rural faith in the past that the disappearance of family 
farmers could be traced to low farm prices and lack of ability to command a 
reward in the market place that was commensurate with contributions to nation-
al welfare. We have recently had farm prices at or above parity levels in 
almost all farm commodities. It remains to be seen whether this dramatic 
shift in farm price levels will be a benefit or a disaster for family farmers. 
As noted above, one of the inhibiting factors that has historically prevented 
large investors from acquring farm lands has been the combination of high 
market and weather risks. A major reason for the durability of a family farm 
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structure is that it could survive catastrophe. It remains to be seen whether 
or not it can survive prosperity. Under our existing institutional structure, 
the prospects are that high and stable farm prices will work to the disadvan-
tage of family farmers by attracting an additional influx of non-farm capital 
that in the past was scared away from farming by high risk. 
Apart from incentives for farm size expansion based on our financial and 
institutional structure, what are the incentives for continued expansion of 
the scale of farm businesses that are determined by technological and pro-
duction considerations in agriculture? In answering this question it is 
important to recognize that we have been led astray by some of the language 
used in discussing this topic in the past. There is a rhetorical tradition 
in the United states that leads us to characterize large scale farms as 
"factories in the field". Much of the recent popular literature discussing 
trends in united states agriculture has included forecasts and sometimes 
artists' drawings showing the farm of the future in a version that has been 
derived from an idealized model of a factory. This imagery is doubly mis-
leading. One major advantage of a factory system is that it permits economies 
of scale in the movement of raw material through successive processing stages. 
The other major economic argument in favor of a large factory is that it per-
mits economies of scale in the supervision of labor. For some types of agri-
culture these two controlling economies can be achieved in large factory-
type installations. The outstanding examples relate to vegetable crops and 
poultry and beefcattle feeding enterprises. Here it has been possible to 
bring together raw materials in a relatively confined space and establish 
production systems that utilize biological processes so designed that they 
resemble a production line structure in a conventional factory. In the 
language of business economics a "batch operation" has been converted into a 
"flow operation". To the extent that it will be possible to convert other 
types of agricultural activity from batch or seasonal enterprises to 
continuous or flow operations, we can expect a continuation of economic and 
technological pressures for the enlargement of farm sizes. 
The reverse of this proposition must also be examined critically. To the 
extent that it is not possible to assemble agricultural raw materials at one 
location and organize them in such a way that they meet the test of a flow 
process, we can expect substantial diseconomies of scale to be associated with 
large scale farm enterprises. This is still the case in those types of farm 
production processes that are based on the conversion of solar energy through 
plant life. As long as chlorophyll photosynthesis remains the cheapest avail-
able means of solar energy conversion, it will be profitable to distribute 
our crop growing activities over geographic space. In this circumstance, it 
will be difficult to satisfy the twin conditions necessary for factory systems 
to prevail, namely economies of size in transport and in labor supervision. 
I do not rule out the possibility that we may see a continuing develop-
ment in automation that will permit field crop enterprises to be converted 
from batch processes to flow processes. This is achieved, for example, in 
large scale hothouse operations where temperature, humidity and water supply 
can be subjected to exact controls. For premium priced fruits, flowers and 
vegetable crops this possibility is capable of further expansion. Some new 
technology makes it even probable that certain classes of field crops may be 
grown under environmentally controlled conditions in the future. At the 
present time, however, these prospects do not seem tangible for field crop 
production on the scale necessary to supply us with basic grain and forage 
inputs. If this is a correct appraisal, then one consequence is that the 
trend toward large scale farm enterprises for field crop production does not 
appear to be dictated by technological considerations. If this trend 
continues, it will almost certainly be due to institutional reasons, 
particularly those relating to price, credit, and tax policy. 
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Another dimension must be considered before this discussion can be re-
garded as balanced. The social structure of farming is a prominent part of 
the total picture. Throughout our history we have had a dispersed pattern of 
agricultural settlement, with family farmsteads dotting the landscapeo with 
few exceptions we have never known the type of village-based agriculture that 
predominates in so many parts of the world. This era of dispersed settlement 
may well be coming to an end. It is ironic that the region of the country 
which in popular mythology has been regarded as most rigorously independent, 
namely the Great Plains, is the region in which we may first see the 
emergence of something akin to the village agriculture of Europe or Asia. 
The isolation involved in scattered farmsteads and ranches in the Great 
Plains is now reaching proportions that render it pathologic in a cultural 
sense. As a consequence, much of the Great Plains is being depopulated in 
two dimensions. Population is declining over large areas, and those who 
remain are clustering in villages and small cities. In the European version 
of this phenomenon, it has been customary to point out that the one-family 
farm is no longer a viable social institution if the family values its leisure 
time at opportunity cost rates of return. Young people, and particularly farm 
wives, are not satisfied to be chained to livestock enterprises in a manner 
that was accepted by their parents. As a result the agricultural price 
policies and planning systems of several European countries, especially Sweden 
and the Netherlands, have established a "two family farm" as the modal enter-
prise which their planning and price policies seek to support. The main 
reason for setting the norm at two families was not technological but social. 
In that way families could have some relief from the demanding work routine 
required by intensive farming. 
On the basis of present trends, it is unlikely that a two-family farm 
model will prosper in the united states. Instead, the solution that seems to 
be emerging is a form of village agriculture in which the social defects of 
isolated one-family farms are being resolved by regrouping farm families in 
urban places. The farms and ranches that survive this economic and social 
change may remain in family hands but they will not resemble traditional family 
farms, in that they may be devoid of rural residences. It is perhaps no 
accident that this physical concentration of rural residences is taking place 
in areas where the social cost of distance generated traditions of fierce 
independence in a past generation, and is associated today with the most 
pronounced pattern of clustering now visible in American agriculture. 
We can now refer back to the introduetory remarks concerning the problems 
faced by American farmers in adjusting to their new status as a minority group. 
This shift in status involves two major dimensions. The most obvious one is 
the reduced ability to muster political strength in legislative processes. 
This is well documented and will not be explored further in this discussion. 
A second dimension is less well understood but is perhaps more significant in 
the long run. At the same time that farmers have been declining in absolute 
numbers and as a percentage of the electorate, an internal shift has taken 
place in the power structure within agriculture. The political decline has 
been associated with an economic concentration. From 1949 to 1969, farms with 
gross receipts from farm sales of $20,000 and over increased their share of 
total farm marketings from 31.5% to 73.5%. In that same time period the index 
of prices received by farmers increased by approximately 10%. Even after 
correction for price level changes, the share of farm marketings accounted for 
by farms with sales of over $20,000 in 1949 prices had more than doubled in 
20 years.6 
6These data and the statistics that follow are from U.S.D.A., Agri-
cultural Statistics, 1972, and earlier years; Farm Income Situation, FIS-222, 
July 1973, pp. 69-71. 
16 
An even more revealing indication of the degree of farm size expansion is 
provided if we compare the economic size of farms required to produce half of 
the total value of farm output in 1949 and 1969. Slightly over 50% of total 
receipts from farm marketings was received by farms with cash sales over 
$10,000 in 1949; by 1969 farms with gross sales of $40,000 and over accounted 
for just under half of total receipts from farm marketings. In 1972, farms 
with sales of over $20,000 per farm were 24.4% of the number of farms and 
accounted for 81.2% of the total cash receipts from farming. We can break 
this upper farm size class down into two groups. Over the past ten years, 
there has been virtually no change in the proportion of total cash receipts 
received by farms with gross sales of $20,000 to $39,999. They accounted for 
19.7% of total cash receipts from farming in 1963 and 20.0% in 1972. All of 
the increase in the proportion of receipts from farm marketings by farms with 
sales over $20,000 has been accounted for by farms with gross sales of $40,000 
and over. In that same ten years they increased their share of total receipts 
from farm marketings from 40.2% in 1963 to 61.2% in 1972. 7 
These data make it clear that the voting strength in agriculture is at 
the low end of the income scale while the economic strength is at the upper 
end. Although it is too soon to draw conclusions from trends of only a decade, 
it is at least plausible to suggest that we are witnessing the development of 
a dual economic structure in American agriculture. This is comprised of a 
relatively numerous sector of small to medium sized family farms, possessing 
some voting strength but little economic muscle. This sector accounts for most 
of the farm population but only a minor fraction of the total value of farm 
output. The second sector is numerically small but economically powerful, and 
thus unable to influence events through ordinary political processes. Lacking 
votes and possessing economic power, it finds it increasingly tempting to 
achieve its goals through the manipulation of the power structure. 
We have already seen the first clear cut evidence of the development of 
this trend in the "chicken war" that broke out in the early 1960's. This 
concerned a small number of large poultry producing firms that saw a lucrative 
overseas market seriously threatened. They were able to mobilize the weapons 
of economic warfare in the united States out of all proportion to their 
numbers or their significance in total economic activity. Additional evidence 
is provided by the recent attempt of organized dairy farmers to use political 
campaign contributions to influence milk price decisions. In a past 
generation, the political influence of dairy farmers would have been exercised 
through the polls. It seems plausible to expect that the next manifestation 
of this use of economic power instead of voting strength to resolve agri-
cultural problems will occur in the beef sector if large scale beef feedlots 
are threatened by price collapses and surplus production. 
An opening theme of this paper can now be restated. To an important 
degree, the critical resource in United States agriculture is no longer land 
but minerals. We are today in a phase in the use of mineral resources that 
invites comparison with hunting, gathering and fishing stages of development, 
before the invention of agriculture. 
With one great difference: In the hunting and gathering phase human 
beings were securing a food supply that was replenished primarily by the 
direct use of solar energy, through chlorophyll photosynthesis. When man 
accomplished the transition to agriculture he did so by a more efficient 
method of ordering and organizing these solar energy processes. The transition 
from manpower-agriculture to animal-power agriculture represented a still more 
efficient organization of these same energy sources. 
7 U.S.D.A., Farm Income Situation, FIS-222, July 1973, pp. 69-71. 
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The most recent transition from animal agriculture to mechanized agri-
culture represents a major change in the mode of energy conversion. until well 
into the twentieth century almost all of our food supply came from flow 
resources derived directly from solar energy. Today a large and rapidly in-
creasing share of our food supply comes from stock resources, primarily petro-
leum, coal and minerals. It is recognition that this stock is limited that 
generates the acute environmental concern that has exploded in the last decade. 
But in what sense is it limited? The finite nature of the world's stock 
of resources can only be defined in terms of man's knowledge of how to use 
these resources. This knowledge gives them value, generates prices, and 
creates a structure of prices that indicates relative values. We have picked 
the "low-hanging fruit" first. We use the cheapest sources of power, until 
they begin to rise in price. Then we set to work to develop new ones. 
Our experience with a heavy reliance on fossil fuels is encompassed by the 
life-span of a man. It is not surprising that we should be having problems of 
accommodation. The wealth and abundance that has resulted from our discovery 
of ways to use stock resources is in fundamental conflict with the social 
systems and religious beliefs we have inherited from our history of resource 
scarcity. 
How can this accommodation be accomplished? 
The simplistic solution is a "return to nature." It is hard to believe 
that sensitive, humane and intelligent people can find this attractive, but 
some do. In its use of space, it is the ultimate form of conspicuous con-
sumption in our society. Quite simply, we do not have land enough at a hoe-
agriculture level of technology to support more than a tiny fraction of the 
world's population. Those who seriously propose this solution are advocating 
a form of genocide. 
A more realistic solution is composed of two parts: 
1.) A search for greater economy in existing patterns of use of stock 
resources. Here there is tremendous scope for improvement, through 
waste recycling, mass transit, improved space heating and cooling, 
longer-lived products, and a list of economizing measures that is 
almost endless. 
2.) A systematic shift to flow sources of solar energy. And this has 
begun. Plant breeders are undertaking experiments to improve the 
biological fixation of nitrogen. Forest products are replacing 
steel,. tin, and aluminum in packaging. But much remains to be done. 
Greatly expanded research is needed in solar space heating, greater 
use of winds and tides, multiple cropping under environmentally 
controlled conditions, zoning to promote land use in areas of 
maximum photosynthesis potential, biological methods of pest and 
disease control, and many other similar uses of flow and renewable 
resources. 
A still bolder solution is to expand research into the possibilities of 
"farming minerals." We now stand at the threshold of the use of solar energy 
and existing stock resources to reproduce and multiply sources of energy that 
are substitues for our present fossil fuels. This is the promise that the 
nuclear breeder reactor holds out. There are enormous problems and great 
risks in this endeavor. But this possibility is no longer in the realm of 
science fiction. 
Agriculture in the united states has had an enviable record of invention, 
innovation, and adaptation, in dimensions both large and small. We have 
achieved a tremendous multiplier effect from our investment in agricultural 
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research and development. One reason is that we have had many small firms 
that experiment at the firm level with the adaptation of new technology. 
If there are only big firms, then the research and development spectrum 
is broken. The main reason why this is true is that responsibility for fail-
ure in hierarchial organizations is focused on the decision makers at the top. 
This holds for firms in private industry or agencies in government. To achieve 
rapid diffusion of social change or new technology the cost of failure must be 
diffused. This is the service performed by a mixed structure of small, medium 
and large firms, or of local, state and federal units of government. 
An alternative approach is to concentrate research and development efforts 
in large public agencies. This has been the approach taken in the Soviet 
Union, for example. Basic research is expanded and increases in planned 
investment can accelerate the output of new technology. But it is not applied, 
or is applied very slowly. The multiplier effect of centralized expenditures 
on research and development is reduced, under hierarchial management systems. 
A concentration of economic power in united states agriculture will find 
its ultimate test in the capacity of the system to promote change. The history 
of large scale firms in the past is that they resist change. This is true 
across cultural and national boundaries, and in private enterprise and social-
ized economic systems. The revolution under way today in United states agri-
culture is a reminder that the shadow of impending structural change is almost 
never recognized until the change is upon us. There is real danger that a 
reasoned examination of the present trend toward economic concentration will 
be rendered impossible by those who identify opponents of bigness with senti-
mental proponents of a return to the family farm. To silence this discussion 
at this stage in our history would be a monumental disservice to United 
states agriculture. 
It is for this reason that we should be grateful to the University of 
Missouri and to the Perry Foundation for this opportunity to meet and discuss 
these vital issues. 
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LESSONS OF HISTORY--PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
ABOUT THE EARTH'S RESOURCES 
Arnold E. Paulson 
Executive Director, National Organization 
of Raw Materials 
When I review the history of economics I come to one conclusion. Eco-
nomics has been the science of failure. Why? Because all we've had since the 
beginning of our national history is periods of boom and bust. A boom and a 
bust. Today we've got the highest interest rates since the days of the Civil 
War. The liquidity crisis of our commercial banks and our industry is the 
worst that it has been in the history of our nation. The loan and deposit 
ratio of all our banks today is at 75%, the highest since 1920. We can't 
seem to know what's causing it. We have all sorts of theories and that's all 
we're operating on -- economic theories.* 
If economics were an exact science like the laws of physics the economists 
of today would be able to solve this monetary problem that faces this country. 
But the crisis continues to grow in spite of all our theories. So the one 
challenge that I want to make to America today is that maybe the time has come 
when we have to sit down and review and revalue our priorities. Let's go back 
and see where we've been. Let's discover where we're at, and where we're 
headed, before it's too late. 
For there's only one solution to the coming devaluation. That's to pre-
vent it from happening. And that's the only reason that I have any interest 
in agriculture. I'm not interested in farmers. I'm interested in America. 
I'm interested in this private enterprise system that we have that's provided 
the greatest incentive for people in all history of civilization and has 
provided the greatest standard of living that the people have ever known. I 
want it to continue. 
One of the reasons that we have this crisis today is that the economic 
formulas are faulty. They're not complete. Something's missing. We've discover-
*1 can testify to one way to beat a bust: it's the way I beat the crash 
of 1929. I did it by going broke in 1928. Some people think that's a joke, 
but it was no joke to me. 
People who are worrying about this coming devaluation don't see it as a 
joke either. 
We probably don't hear too much about it but I've had the opportunity the 
last couple of years to meet, acquaint myself, and counsel some of the wealth-
iest people in the united States. Some of the real wealthy oil people and big 
bankers. You may not be frightened, but I'll tell you something, they're 
frightened stiff. Because they know and they understand the monetary crisis 
that exists in the United States today and they don't know what to do to 
protect themselves. One other thing they don't understand is what brought this 
crisis about, what caused it. And there are no solutions in the making as to 
how we can prevent it. President Nixon has been working for five years now 
trying to stop inflation. From 1969 to the present time, five years, the 
harder he has worked trying to check inflation, the worse it has become. 
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ed the propensity to spend, the propensity to lend and all the other propensi-
ties except one. The propensity for profit. And it's impossible to operate 
any economic system whether it's Communism, Socialism, Fascism, or our 
capitalistic system -- it is impossible to operate it without capital profit. 
The only difference in the united States is here we have people's capitalism, 
where the people make the capital investment and they have to have the profit, 
whereas in Russia it's state capitalism and the state has to have the profit 
in order to invest in new plants, machinery and equipment -- to provide jobs 
for the expanding labor force and for economic growth. It doesn't make any 
difference what system we have, "we have to have a profit." And if we don't 
we continue to monetize debt like we've been doing for the past 20 years in 
the united states. 
I have to laugh every time I read the newspapers about the projections 
for economic growth. We're going to have about 6% next year, they say. We 
don't even understand the meaning of economic growth. We don't know what it 
means. Because all we're going to have next year is the same as we had last 
year and the 10 or 15 years preceding. We're going to have another 150 
billion dollars of debt expansion with no growth. That's what it's going to be, 
because when we evaluate the economic records of this country, we've reached 
the point now where it is necessary for the entire nation to reborrow every 
single dollar we pay on all forms of debt each year. We have to borrow all of 
it back -- plus another $150 billion or more to avoid a recession. Now that's 
a pretty tough one to absorb. But get hold of the united States government's 
statistical abstract and the economic report of the President of the united 
States and check it out for yourself. 
Another thing that confuses the American people is profits. All we talk 
about is gross profits and gross savings. What does it mean? It all includes 
payment on debt. In other words if we pay a hundred billion dollars a year 
on our debt, mortgage payments on homes and factories and plants, that's 
savings, "gross savings." But we can't spend it, because we've already spent 
it. We can't use it for capital expansion unless we remortgage and reborrow, 
to spend, to buy. This is the situation that we're in today. 
We've also been living under the theory that agriculture isn't entitled 
to a return on its investment. We can't give agriculture, the largest industry 
in the entire world, the type of profit it should have and the return on its 
investment because the costs are too high. It was just a few years ago that 
we attended an agricultural seminar something like this down in Fort worth, 
Texas with the economists and the Vice president from the Kansas City Federal 
Reserve was there and after he completed his talk we started to discuss agri-
culture with him. We've discussed everything this morning except this one 
thing. We've talked about the different types of agriculture that may reign 
tomorrow. will it be the family farm? will it be vertical integration? will 
it be corporate? But you know we haven't even mentioned the feudal system, 
have we? And this is what it's going to be. A feudal system with the govern-
ment owning and controlling all of the land and we'll end up with tenant 
farmers, because unless agriculture can have a profit it cannot survive. 
And it doesn't make any difference whether it ends up in the hands of 
corporations, vertically integrated groups of people, or the family type farm, 
it still must have a profit or it can't survive. 
We've talked about the efficiency in agriculture this morning. About the 
efficiency of the big operators. We've talked about subsidy payments and how 
they were allocated. We've talked about capital gains in agriculture. Well 
now if we want to discover and analyze the efficiency in agriculture let's 
wipe out all of the subsidies that went to the big efficient operators; let's 
wipe out their capital gains advantages and compare it to the family type farm 
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and then see how efficient they are. They couldn't survive; they'd be bank-
rupt. And the only one who'd be making it is that family farmer that we talk-
ed about who's got a part time job in town, to supplement his income. 
I believe it was Dryden who said, "Some truth there was but brewed and 
dashed with lies, to please the fools and puzzle all the wise." Now we've got 
so many theories and ideologies today, I believe we've got more of them than 
there are religions in India, and the thing that we the American people have 
got to do, regardless of which walk of life we travel -- whether we're the 
banker, the businessman, the farmer, the educator or the professional man --
it's time that we adopt the real philosophy of life and discover the truth. 
What is truth? What are the facts about agriculture? Can we expect the 
largest industry in the entire world that has a capital investment of 60% of 
all the other industries in the United States to operate without a return on 
its investment? Is this fair? If it's fair, is it profitable? Can the 
economy afford it? Let's find out before it's too late. 
Now we people are the stockholders of the greatest corporation the world 
has ever known. We're the stockholders of the united States Government; we're 
the stockholders of the American enterprise system. And the Federal Govern-
ment compels all of us at the end of each year to prepare a profit and loss 
statement and a balance sheet on our individual business and our individual 
income. When we do this it enables us to know where we've been, where we're 
at, and where we're headed as a business. It tells us whether we made a 
profit, whether we lost money or whether we're headed for bankruptcy. And 
here we are, probably the most intellectual people in the world, and never 
once in the history of this country have we the stockholders ever asked the 
united States Government for a profit and loss statement and a balance sheet 
on our corporation. What is the financial condition of the United States? 
Does anybody in this auditorium know? If we don't know, how can we discuss 
problems unless we know all of the facts. We can't -- and as Dr. Leon 
Keyserling once said, "We are flying blind, we don't know where we are going." 
For two years 1957-1958, the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of 
the United States conducted hearings on the financial condition of the United 
States. All of the experts, present and past, were invited to testify. Read 
and analyze the nine volumes of itestimony presented at these hearings and 
arrive at your own conclusion. The ball game was practically over in 1958. 
As a result of those hearings, Congress soon declared gold barbaric, no 
longer of value. WHY WAS GOLD SUDDENLY BARBARIC? The reason was we didn't 
have any left. The reason was that in 1958 we were already internationally 
bankrupt; we had no choice. Don't take my word for it. Review the reports 
and the hearings yourself. What did President Nixon do on August IS, 1971 
when he enacted Phase I? Buried deep in his 10 point program was the key to 
the whole thing and it went over the heads of all the people in this country. 
It was buried intentionally. He placed an embargo on gold. This is what it 
was all about: One of his own economists, Pierre Renfret, publicly admitted 
what it was all about when he addressed the Toronto Investors Club, in 
Toronto, Cdnada. He said if the U~ited States Government had been a 
corporation like all other corporations it would have amounted to a Chapter 10 
bankruptcy. 
Nixon actually told the rest of the world that the United states could no 
longer meet its international monetary obligations as spelled out in the 
Bretton Woods Agreement. Only he said it in more refined terms so that the 
people didn't understand it. And so all we've been trying to do is shore up 
the dollar for the international bankers so that they don't lose their shirts 
on the exchange value of currency. 
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We heard talk this morning about how agriculture can not expect a return 
on its investment. Yet the printing presses are pumping out two million 
dollars of currency every hour and we're monetizing that at 10% interest. 
This is what they're charging. They are creating this money out of nothing. 
printing press money. The government prints the money and the Federal Reserve 
buys it for the cost of printing and it's being issued now at 10 percent 
interest. These DEBT dollars are being monetized. Yet we are trying to say to 
those who produce the real wealth of this country, that we can't afford to 
give them a return on their investment because it costs too much. 
I say it's time that we redraw our national priorities and discover where 
and what went wrong. I prepare a perpetual balance sheet and operating loss 
statement on the economy of the United states on the same basis as every 
business and industry and corporation has to do at the end of each year. It's 
very simple to do, because all we have to do is consolidate all of the segments 
of the United states into one giant business. We break it down into six 
different groups. We take the corporations, the small business and professional 
people, rental income, agriculture, wages, and interest. Those six segments 
contain every segment of American life. Every dollar of income is represented. 
My predecessor started compiling this back in 1936. And so now each year we 
can see the changes and we can make projections on what to expect in the coming 
years. Now what has happened to the profit structure of the American enter-
prise system over the past 20 years? Well, if we don't know, we don't know, 
do we? Because what we don't know, we don't know. But we'd better find out. 
We read in the newspapers about the gigantic increase in profits of 
corporations. Increase from what? Increase from nothing? The same thing 
applies to the small businessman. Well I'm interested in agriculture, but not 
for the same reasons as our Land Grant Colleges, or the farm organizations, 
or the farmers themselves. I'm interested in agriculture because of the 
impact that it has on the lives of everybody throughout the united states and 
the rest of the world. 
What effect does agriculture have on the income and the profits and the 
losses of our entire enterprise system? What effect does agricultural income 
have on the small businessman? What effect does it have on the ability of 
business and industry to meet the wage, the interest, and the tax cost of 
operating the economic system? 
This is a tough one because there aren't too many people over the past 
40 or 50 years that have even given it a thought. And so when we evaluate the 
economy of the united States and agriculture and try to correlate we have to 
pit one against the other. After all, economics is nothing more than the 
production and the distribution of goods and services. Right? What else is 
there? If we remove the production and distribution of goods and services 
from the face of the earth what would remain? Nothing but the spiritual, the 
mystic. But you see what's happened now over the past 20 years -- it started 
some 40 years ago -- we've made economics the flow of money. The flow of debt, 
credit, and interest. And the production and the distribution of goods and 
services and their value have been almost forgotten. 
All we can think of is the efficiency of production. Yet, the maximum 
of efficiency would be actually producing everything for nothing. When we do 
that, then nobody would have any income with which to buy. 
Now, fully as important for any nation to have the ability to produce 
goods and services is its ability to create or generate the earned income to 
buy and exchange the production. As an example, if the united States produces 
$1 trillion worth of goods and services this year, then it is equally as 
important that the nation create or generate $1 trillion worth of earned in-
come in order to buy and exchange the production. 
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If we don't create the earned income from production times price, we lose 
the markets because the people don't have the income to buy back what they are 
capable of producing, unless of course, we make credit available -- and sub-
stitute DEBT EXPANSION in lieu of earned income so people can borrow the money 
and go into debt to buy the production to support somebody else's job. 
We have learned about the propensity to spend and lend,but we haven't 
discovered the propensity of profits necessary to repay the debts. If we 
review the historic records of this country, we will discover that this is 
what has been going on for the past twenty years or more -- and that is what 
inflation is all about. Inflation is nothing more than a scheme to increase 
the value of the collateral that we use to borrow more money and go deeper into 
debt. And this is exactly what we've been doing in agriculture. We've made 
agriculture so efficient that it can't finance itself and so every year we 
inflate the value of the land so the farmers can go back to the bank and borrow 
more money and go deeper into debt on the same acres. 
This is what Mr. Rossiter was explaining, from 1937 to 1972. Nobody 
can operate without profit. The best definition that I've ever heard in all 
my life of economics was given by a black minister who was sitting in an 
economics seminar one time and nobody understood what they were talking about, 
so he got up and tried to explain to the people that what they're trying to 
say is this: "if your outgo exceeds your income, your upkeep will be your 
downfall". Now this is true with the individual, with the family, with the 
community, with every state and every nation. We must have income equal to 
the cost of production so that we can buy and exchange it with one another, 
and if not, we'll eventually monetize so much debt that we bankrupt the 
system. 
Let's take one look at inflation and then we're going to look at the cause. 
I wonder how many people realize that the interest that our corporations are 
paying on debt today contributes more to inflation than all of the profits 
that every corporation in the united States earns including the profits of all 
of our banks, insurance companies and financial institutions. The interest 
they pay on debt contributes more to inflation than all of their profits 
combined. In 1971 the total corporate profits after taxes was 44.6 billion 
dollars. And just using simple 5% interest on their debt, their interest was 
2 billion dollars more than all of their profits combined. 
How many of you people have ever heard housewives protest about the high 
cost of interest? Let's take a look at agriculture and all of our raw material 
production. We now have a gross publ·ic and private debt of 24 hundred billion 
dollars. It's increased about 17 hundred billion dollars in the last 22-23 
years and we call this prosperity. Simple 5% interest on 25 hundred billion 
dollars of debt is 120 billion dollars of interest per year. Now this com-
pounds. I'm using 5% simple interest. The total gross income for all of the 
raw material production in the United States last year, or 1971 -- that's all 
of our agriculture, food, fiber, forestry, fishing, all of the minerals and 
all of the oil and chemicals -- was 96 billion dollars. And only a fraction 
of this was food. And yet the housewives of America protest because farm 
prices are too high, and they paid 120 billion dollars in interest. You see 
our priorities are all mixed up. And who is going to tell this to the American 
housewife if the farm people and the people who are associated in agriculture 
won't tell them? This is our story. 
We brought this up this morning and I agree with it, it's a danger to talk 
about how efficient agriculture is. One farmer today could feed 48 to 50 
other people. This is not true and it never has been true. We've got the 
greatest farmers in the world, but they're not that good. One farmer today, 
with the help of 35 other people in town, can feed 48 people. All we've done 
in agriculture is, we've moved all the labor off the farm and into the cities. 
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Into the plants and the factories. Into the agribusiness. Into the trans-
portation, education, research centers, and every penny of income for every 
agribusiness, every agricultural manufacturing plant, International Harvester, 
Allis Chalmers, John Deere, right on down the line, every dollar they've got 
invested in their buildings, machinery, equipment, technology; every dollar of 
wages they pay, every penny of interest; all of the profits that they earn is 
all part of the farm labor cost. Why? We've just moved them from the farm 
into town. Where do they recover their costs? The only people who buy their 
product is the farmer. 
If the farmer doesn't have a return on his investment and receive his 
cost of production plus a reasonable profit for his risk and work, who's going 
to support the giant agri-industries that we're all working for? If we're 
going to have a solvent agri-cultural industry in town we've got to have a 
solvent agricultural industry in the country. They both have to support each 
other. 
It's time that we start to analyze many of these things and discover 
what really makes the economy of this country tick. I'd like to get into the 
imports and the free trade -- the reciprocal trade agreement. The reciprocal 
trade agreement passed in 1934 was passed as a peace program, not only as an 
agricultural program. And up until then, we had tariffs that protected scab 
labor and cheap foreign imports from coming into the united states. We didn't 
have any threats of war. We didn't have our military scattered allover the 
world to protect the investments of the internationalists who were exploiting 
the rest of the world. So we adopted the reciprocal trade agreement for peace. 
The idea was to get rid of our farm surpluses and we would promote world peace 
with food, and all we have had since then is war. Hot war and cold war and 
we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars to try and preserve the peace 
and today we've got our young men scattered in 45 countries of the world to 
protect the exploitation of the internationalists who want raw materials for 
nothing, or as cheap as they can get them. 
I've been visiting with many of the independent oil people, some of the 
biggest in the world, and they tell me that the problems of the independent 
oil people are identical to the problems of the independent farmer. The 
energy crisis didn't happen two-three weeks ago or a year ago. We've seen this 
coming for several years but we would not pay an honest price to the independ-
ents to dig the wells and to produce the oil. We wanted it for as little as 
possible. If you'll pardon the expression, we got caught with our pants down, 
knowing what was coming. And now we're over a barrel. We've made many mis-
takes because of our failure to open our eyes and to evaluate what's been 
going on. 
The reason the economy of the united states of America is in the worst 
monetary crisis in its history is because of our treatment to agriculture. 
It's the cause of the problems in America today, or almost all of them. Be-
cause we as a people have forgotten where new wealth comes from. We've for-
gotten w~at it's worth. The only thing we've been able to do as citizens of 
this country is to think about business profits. That's all we know, and it's 
all we understand. And it's absolutely impossible to have new net business 
profits without first having economic profits. And yet when we go to 
Washington and counsel with Congressmen and Senators and travel across the 
country to the universities and we start talking about economic profits they 
don't understand what we're talking about. 
What is an economic profit? What's the difference between a business 
profit and an economic profit? We know that business profits can be derived 
from thousands of different sources. One of the best sources that I know of 
is that you and I could go out and rob a bank tomorrow. And if we didn't get 
caught we'd make a healthy profit. And this would be a business profit. But 
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unfortunately there wouldn't be any profit for the system because our profit 
was derived from somebody else's loss. And whether we believe it or not this 
is the way that the business profits have been achieved for almost 20 years. 
We could do the same by robbing the church collection plate. If we didn't 
get caught we'd make a profit. 
How is it possible for everybody, every group, every segment, within the 
economy of this country to make a profit without anybody having to lose? Is 
it possible? Well it better be possible, or there is no solution to the 
future. 
All we've been doing is playing a poker economy. I want to use this one 
simple illustration. If we were going to nail all the doors of this auditorium 
shut right now and convert this room into a gambling casino, we would play all 
of the different types of gambling, chuck-a-luck and roulette and poker and 
everything else. But before the game starts we would have each and everyone 
of you people march by up in front. You would empty your pockets and declare 
exactly the amount of money that you have on you before the game starts. This 
would be our total money supply. Then the games start. Every time the wheels 
of fortune spin and the money changes hands we'd tabulate it, and this would 
be our gross volume of business (GNP~ And the faster it turns over would be 
the velocity turnover of the money. And we'd play here all day and all night 
and all next week and we can do millions of dollars of business and we can have 
a whopping gross sales volume and profit. And then before we leave and go home 
you'd all march back past the table and declare the amount of money that you 
have. There could be millions of dollars of profits earned but when we added 
up the amount of money at the end of the game there wouldn't be one penny more 
than when the game started. Where did the profits come from? They all came 
from somebody else's loss. 
This is the way we've been operating this economy. Why? Because there's 
been nothing new added to the system except added debt. Where can we get some-
thing for nothing? Everybody has been trying to get it. An economic profit 
has to come from some source that never has to be repaid. An economic profit 
is the profit that we add on top of everything else that we had before, that 
was nonexistent before. Where does it come from? Well, the only thing non-
existent that comes into being that wasn't here last year is the raw materials 
that we extract from nature. From the land, the sea, and the air. In the 
form of food and fiber, minerals, fossil fuel, etc. 
What else has been added? This is the new wealth that we produce and add 
to the stockpile of everything that we had before. But unfortunately if we 
take the 5~ to 6 billion bushels of corn that we produced this year and add 
it to the system we had the corn but how much monetary value did we add to the 
system if corn didn't have a price, if it were free? If corn is a dollar a 
bushel we added 6 billion dollars of economic profit to the system. And so 
the only economic profit that we earn each year is the price that we pay for 
all of the raw materials that have been brought into being. And outside of 
that there is none and nobody can prove it, except for one thing: the interest 
profits that we make from the debt expansion. And so we are now operating 
negatively. At simple 5% interest it takes 120 billion dollars a year to pay 
the interest on the gross public and private debt and we only create 96 billion 
dollars of new wealth or economic profit and this is the reason we have to re-
borrow the money to pay the interest and 150 billion dollars of capital debt 
expansion on top of it. Every year we have to borrow more and more. Why? Be-
cause we have to pay the additional interest cost on the additional 150 billion 
we had to borrow over last year. 
This doesn't only involve farmers. This involves every single one of us, 
business, industry. It affects the faculties of our schools and colleges and 
universities because this is your life. And if we don't stabilize this thing 
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and turn this thing around and develop a solvent economic system, you're going 
to lose everything just like everybody else. There'll be no escape. And so 
I look at agriculture not as a farm problem but as a universal problem that 
affects all of us. And agriculture has got to have an honest return on its 
cost of production, its investment, risk, and work, in spite of farmers. In 
spite of them and. regardless of who controls it, because it's the only way that 
this nation will create the income and the capital profits, the new wealth, 
to finance the system. Agriculture has been receiving approximately 50% of 
the income that it should have rightfully had for almost 20 years, until the 
last 12 to 18 months. How has this affected the income of the corporations, 
the small businessman and the rest of them? Well, we've tabulated it. And 
their profits are down in almost directly the same ratio as agriculture. The 
corporations have only been earning about 60% of the income and the profits 
that they should have to operate a solvent corporate structure. Earning 
profits from each other's debt! The independent businessmen and professional 
people have been earning about 65% of the income that they should have. The 
amazing thing is that even the ratios that Carl Wilken worked out way back in 
'36, and he went all the way back into the 1800's to analyze this, that up 
until about 1962, 70% of the total monetary value of all of the raw material 
production used and consumed in this country came from our farms in the form 
of farm products. The other 30% was all of the other minerals, the oil, 
fossil fuels, etc. 
A year or so ago (1971), in spite of low farm prices agriculture still 
represented about 65 percent of all the production and consumption in dollar 
value of total raw material production. Why was it so close if farm prices 
were so low? Because the value -- the price -- of oil and other raw materials 
was also underpriced in almost exact ratio to farm prices. 
If farm prices alone had been underpriced, then the spread or ratio would 
have been greater. And so the challenge that I want to extend to everybody 
today, and I'm not extending it in the form of criticism or ridicule, I'm 
extending it as a challenge -- let's discover the truth, let's find out how 
important agricultural income is to you regardless of which walk of life you 
travel. Because if we don't create the economic profits to operate a sound 
economic system we're going to see the devaluation that many of the people are 
talking about today. And today we've got over 10 times the debt involved that 
we had in the '30's. 
This means that we could experience something that could be at least 10 
times as serious as anything that we've ever experienced before. And this is 
why agriculture is important to me. Because of the income that agriculture 
produces to help finance and stabilize the entire economy. Agriculture when 
it has the right percentage of income creates the jobs and the plants and the 
factories in the cities. 
My time is up but I want to just explain in one minute what's happened 
this past year. It's unbelievable. The states can't figure out why there's 
been such a tremendous increase in state sales tax revenue as we've experienced 
this year. The state of Illinois as of July or August had an 85 million dollar 
increase. The country banks can't figure out why their bank deposits have 
increased at the ratio they've increased, some of them up to 25% instead of 
the 2~/o growth that existed before. The only thing that's changed is agri-
culture. Farm prices. The farmers finally got a little of the prosperity 
that they deserve and they came into town and they started to payoff their 
bills. When they paid the bills there was sales tax and they started to order 
new machinery and equipment and they paid sales tax. They couldn't buy the 
machinery and the equipment and the cars and the trucks so they had to put 
some of the money in the bank until these goods are available and as a result 
bank deposits increased. It increased so alarmingly that we've got country 
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bankers back home that are worried sick. They said corn should never be over 
80¢ a bushel, "we don't know what to do with the money c " The state of Illinois, 
it is reported, is talking about cutting its state sales tax for the very same 
reason. Nebraska the same. This is what farm prosperity does for the nation. 
This nation can have perpetual prosperity and on a sound solvent economic 
basis if we will but open our eyes and discover the basic facts that All New 
Wealth Comes from Nature in the form of raw material production -- and that 
this new wealth is worth no more in monetary terms than the price we as a 
nation are willing to pay ourselves for it. 
We do have a choice. We can continue to underpay ourselves as a nation 
for all of our new wealth production and continue to monetize debt until the 
system grinds into a total collapse, OR, 
We can start immediately to MONETIZE REAL WEALTH and create the necessary 
annual earned income necessary to finance a sound, stable, solvent economic 
system for our nation. 
I am very sorry, my time is up. 
noon discussing this topic with you. 
I wish I could spend the entire after-
It's been a pleasure to be here. 
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PROSPECTIVE SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND PRICING SITUATION 
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The title of this talk is as familiar as it is formidable. Just about 
everyone is wondering what the supply/demand situation for U. S. farm 
products, short and long term, may be. Just about everyone admits that much 
uncertainty surrounds the issue. 
"Everyone" means just that; it is not confined, chauvinistically, to 
citizens of the United States. To the world-scope of concern I can testify; 
and therein lies the only exceptional feature of my talk. The text that 
follows was drafted in a hotel room in Sao Paulo, Brazil during an interlude 
between sessions of an international meeting of agricultural economists. 
Speakers at the meeting showed a remarkable sensitivity to the production 
situation in our nation. They demonstrated, too, a remarkable willingness to 
express an opinion about it, however thin their knowledge. 
But those persons quickly expanded the issue to the world as a whole. 
For the questions we in the U. S. ask about our supply-demand position are 
being duplicated in questions other peoples ask about the world situation. 
This is true even of the developing nations that have experienced the so-call-
ed Green Revolution and are now worrying about how green it really is. 
The reason for commonality of interest is not hard to find. All food 
producing nations are subject to the same influences of variable weather, 
quixotic demand, and even uncertain resources. Furthermore, they are bound 
together in a network of trade that has tougher threads than we like to 
acknowledge. 
The local Brazilian setting was favorable to contemplating the U.S., 
hemispheric, and even world food conditions. Brazil is not only the home of 
aromatic coffee and of Pele, the world's best soccer player. It is also a 
country that possesses one of the world's few remaining areas of virgin 
productive land. We gringos saw some of it, on a trip west from Sao Paulo. 
Though quick to comment, the world's leading economists assembled in Sao 
Paulo revealed a sharp division in their assessment of the overall food 
situation. One viewpoint nevertheless found itself at a tactical disadvantage. 
Those souls, whether from the U. S., Brazil, or Belgium, who purred 
reassurances that present shortages are strictly temporary and surpluses will 
soon reappear found themselves on the defensive. In the aggressors' role were 
persons holding the opposite opinion, namely, that we cannot expect the horn 
of plenty to be refilled soon, thereupon to spillover into both the well-fed 
and hungry areas of this Spaceship Earth. 
A brief reflection on human psychology will help interpret diverse 
currents of opinion. For all their claims about how scientific they are, 
economists are subject to psychological influences. For example, some 
individuals at the Brazil meeting revealed apprehensions about the productivity 
of U. S. agriculture because their homelands are so vulnerable to any short-
fall. This is true of representatives of Japan and several European countries 
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that have been buying our foodstuffs so regularly as to have built up a 
dependence on them. We could reprove their reading so much implied promise 
into Yankee trading, were it not that the U. S. has begged, promoted, and even 
subsidized their buying from us. It is not hard to understand why Japan, for 
example, feels vexed when we change overnight not only our sales pitch but 
our sales contracts. 
The less affluent nations are equally apprehensive and annoyed. For 
almost 20 years the U. S. grandiloquently acted as food storer and dispenser 
for nations that always live on the edge of misery. No matter that our largess 
in our Food for Peace program was partly self-serving. We declared our charit-
able intentions and called them a part of our foreign policy. Our recent 
denial of a two-decades-Iong posture is visible to all. In response, the FAO 
has called again for a World Food Bank to replace the storage service that 
the U. S. provided until recently. 
Wounded Pride 
If some economists turn dismal because of their apprehensions, others are 
swayed into optimism by a subconscious need to protect their professional egos. 
Economists have brazenly claimed some credit for the steady rise in agri-
cultural productivity that for a century and a half has forestalled Malthus' 
dire forebodings. According to their self-image, economists have contributed 
expertise to the development and combining of the resources of production. 
Their calculations have extended from choosing an economical ration for pigs I 
to designing a national policy for conservation and use of land. These 
economists would like to think they are still helping to keep production 
rising. 
Thus we have the interesting pairing wherein some economists of the world 
are pessimists out of fear they won't have enough to eat, and others optimists 
out of a need to see their egos validated. 
Other Mixed Feelings 
Lest I seem to take my fellow economists too much to task, let two other 
illustrations of mixed or biassed feelings be offered. 
Farmers, for example, have their own split personalities. Like everyone 
else they are not just economic men but have mixed aspirations. I am convinced 
that they take genuine satisfaction in producing wholesome food for people to 
eat. They like to see their pastures green and their corn ears crowded with 
kernels. At the same time they know about the law of demand. They have 
learned that superabundant production does not reward them as a class. 
The confusions and paradoxes in the present inflationary situation do not 
escape farmers. My hunch is that most farmers, particularly crop farmers, 
like the prices of the past year and can dream of keeping them, but in sober 
moments they would willingly return to something closer to normal that is 
more dependable for the future. 
One other group deserves mention. It is the officials of the party that 
at any time holds power. Political leaders simply must have an optimistic 
streak in them. It is necessary for heads of state to promise both produc-
IA personal incident illustrates the need of agronomists and animal 
scientists for such help. As an undergraduate I enrolled in a course in feeds 
and feeding, where Iwas taught how to balance rations for maximum daily gain. 
When I drew on what I had learned in agricultural economics to apply cost and 
price data, showing that profit criteria would yield different solutions, the 
professor was astonished. He had not considered the point. 
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tivity and prosperity. They cannot do otherwise. Since the behavior is both 
biologically instinctive and strategically mandatory, there is no hint of re-
proval in these remarks. The only moral to be drawn is that a certain 
correction factor must be read into official pronouncements at a time such as 
this. 
The 1972-7? Episode 
Against this background of world-wide apprehensions and the dilemma fac-
ing individual farmers, let us consider what we know and what we do not know 
about the supply-demand situation in U. S. agriculture in october 1973. 
I think we know this much: 
(1) We know that the basic or normal position in the world food balance, 
as viewed in its long historical sweep,. is one of deficit, nor surplus. Only 
through heroic achievement is food production pushed steadily higher. Upon 
any lapse in effort or any string of natural disasters, production will level 
out or even slip backward. It is incorrect and even vainglorious to suppose 
that a continuous uptrend in production is the normal state of affairs. 
(2) We know that the quantitative difference between too much and too 
little food is narrow. This statement refers to food as a whole. The ease of 
switching among foods when the total food supply is unchanged seriously mis-
represents the consequences of even small changes in total food supply. 
This rather simple axiom has been presented to many Missouri audiences by 
my colleague Clarence Klingner. 
In technical language, i.t says that the aggregate demand function for food 
is extremely inelastic. The ~urve is very steep. This is particularly true in 
a high-income country such as the U. S. However, it is valid in all nations. 
(3) Extending point (2) further, we know that in the short run consumers 
will divert sizable amounts of their income to food. They protest and complain 
and write letters to the editor of their newspaper and to their Congressman, 
but they spend the extra money. Manifestly, many lower income consumers are 
less able to fight with their dollars to get scarce food. 
(4) We know that when a food shortage is world-wide, the wealthier 
nations behave just like wealthier consumers here at home. They use their 
dollars -- of which they have plenty just now! -- to outbid others for U. S. 
feedstuffs and foodstuffs. Our devaluation added further to their ability to 
buy the products of our farms, ranches, and orchards. 
U. S. farm products obviously now command a strong position in world 
trade. Whether this is the unmixed blessing it is sometimes alleged to be is 
a different issue -- it is something we do not know for sure. 
(5) In a different vein, we know something about the sources of past 
gains in the capacity of U. S. agriculture to provide food and fiber for our 
and other people. Physically, those gains have come largely from drawing on 
ever-increasing quantities of resources of industrial origin. Technically, 
they are attributable to scientific research and education, which first 
discovered how to use the new resources and then taught farmers the tricks of 
doing so. Institutionally, a system of proprietary landholding farming, 
which gave the operating farmer latitude in management and a measure of reward 
for his achievement, must be credited with contributing to our agricultural 
progress. 
What "resources of industrial origin" have been so instrumental? Not 
those that save human labor, but those that (1) save horsepower and (2) make 
land more productive. The modern generation forgets how much land was freed 
for other uses when the tractor and petroleum fuel replaced horses. Of 
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resources that add to land's productiveness, chemical fertilizers stand far 
out in front. Pesticides and similar chemicals are a distant second. 
(6) The sixth and last certainty is that the world has vast unmet needs 
for food for good nutrition. Only in irresponsible circles is the Green 
Revolution credited with solving the world's food problems. The new varieties 
of grain are adapted only to areas having adequate water available at 
precisely the right times. Moreover, they make heavy demands on chemical 
fertilizer. The Green Revolution is marvelous but far from a universal 
solution to food needs, which remain great in many areas of the world. It 
is lack of buying power that puts a ceiling on demand for food. 
Our Uncertainties 
Regrettably, the six things we know are not enough to answer our funda-
mental question. We must resort to judgments in the arena of uncertainty. 
The first three observations below are on the positive side regarding 
the future productive capacity of U. s. agriculture. The last five are 
negative. 
(1) First to be named is the prospect of rebounding from certain tempo-
rary factors. As examples: 
(a) In three of the last four years (including 1973) crop harvests 
in the U. s. were reduced by bad weather or disease. This is 
worse than normal probability. We can hope for better luck in 
the future. 
It must be admitted, though, that some scanners of weather 
patterns say they see a cyclical sequence in weather conditions. 
If they are correct, we will be in for a bad time. 
(b) In 1972 poor crop conditions showed up in many parts of the 
world. This almost had to be coincidental, and is not likely 
to be repeated. In fact, conditions seem to be much better 
this year. 
(2) Technical knowledge keeps advancing. Moreover, a lot of present 
knowledge has not yet been put into practice. 
(3) Federal farm programs are showing built-in flexibility. All 
restrictions on acreage of wheat, feed grains and cotton have been lifted for 
1974. 
These are the three principal considerations that point to larger U. s. 
farm output in the future. They carry a hint that world output also will 
rebound. 
The following are on the conservative side with respect to the likely 
scale of further increases in U. S. production. 
(4) Industrial resources made available to farming will not be as plenti-
ful in the future as in the past. Even if allocations protect agriculture, 
purchase prices will be substantially higher than previously. 
Petroleum for diesel fuel and gasoline is the most advertised instance, 
but shortages of natural gas may prove more damaging. About 90 percent of all 
nitrogen for fertilizer is produced from natural gas, the supply of which is 
likely to approach exhaustion within a relatively few years. 
Likewise, though they are overlooked in the furor about energy, a number 
of metals important to agriculture are becoming scarcer. 
Farmers have long taken plentiful fuel and fertilizer for granted. They 
will not be able to indulge in that luxury any longer. Adjustments to follow 
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in U. S. agriculture will take many forms and sink deep. 
(5) Although technological advances in farming are continuing, as noted 
in (2) above, no dramatic breakthroughs have come about recently. We are 
mainly building on past achievements. Perhaps hybrid wheat and soybeans lie 
just over the horizon, but they are not clearly in sight yet. We seem to be 
on a technological plateau. 
(6) If we are going to have to make do with a less generous supply of 
industrial inputs than in the past, the spotlight of attention will naturally 
shift to that resource by which man has fed and clothed himself for countless 
millenia, namely, land. If we find we will need more land than in the past, 
we will also find that we don't have as much of it as we thought we did. 
During the years of land retirement programs, when land seemed permanent-
ly in surplus, we wantonly let millions of acres of it slip into nonfarm uses. 
Corn land and cotton land and grazing land went into home sites and industrial 
plants and superhighways and military bases and airports. Seldom if ever were 
nonfarm developments diverted away from fertile farmland. On the contrary, 
good farmland often was the first choice because it required less earthmoving 
to convert it to the nonfarm use that was sought. 
A recent controversy in Illinois illustrates. An atomic energy plant has 
been scheduled for construction in the north central part of the state. 
Commonwealth Edison chose a block of 7,000 acres of the best Illinois corn and 
soybean land because it "lay so well", in place of more rolling land that 
actually is located closer to the plant site. When citizens objected, the AEC 
approved the location but reduced the size to 3,000 acres. Those acres will 
be lost to farming forever. 
This year U. S. farmers planted crops on about 330 million acres. This 
acreage was 26 million more than in 1972, but it was 40 million below the peak 
years of the past. A modest further increase in 1974 will leave us still well 
below the high mark of the past. 
(7) In my brief paragraph above listing the factors that have contributed 
to the wonderful record of productivity of U. S. agriculture I included the 
institutional organization of agriculture. 
Now I must add the note that, in my judgment, certain changes in organi-
zation are reducing the responsiveness of farm production to price incentives, 
and its overall output. Although we perpetuate the image that most farming 
is done by rugged individuals who give full attention to farming their 200 or 
400 acres (more in range country), the fact is that "you can't hardly get 
that kind no more." Aside from the widespread practice of part-ownership, 
there is a vast amount of part-time farming, retirement farming, farming by 
agribusiness corporations, hobby farming, tax-loss farming, large-scale farm-
ing, and nominal farming of land held for speculation, sometimes under the 
shelter of differential assessment. 
What is the overall effect of these varied arrangements? On the whole, 
I believe, those operations are not in the mainstream of agriculture. They 
are insulated to some extent from the pressure the typical family farmer has 
always felt to press as hard as he could to make his land productive. The 
part-time farmer may do his plowing when his wage job allows him free time. 
The hobby farmer may raise fine beef cows on the best corn land. The specu-
lative holder of land scratches it just enough to qualify for tax concessions. 
The net effect is negative, I believei and it shows up more in livestock than 
in crop production. 
(8) Lastly, the present higher incomes of crop farmers and the high risk 
implicit in this year's prices of livestock have on balance tended to dis-
courage livestock farmers from expanding their operations. In a brief if 
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salty word, if a grain farmer can make enough income from his grain operations 
why should he board a bunch of hogs or cows 365 days a year? And particularly 
why should he do so if he fears a "deflationary adjustment" (that is, a bust) 
in livestock prices? 
supply prospects: A Sum-up 
By a simple tally, the above listing has five items pointing to conserva-
tive prospects for farm output and only three on the positive side. More 
significant is that the points of uncertain knowledge outnumber those of 
certainty by eight to six. 
In a summary judgment, the prospects are different for the crop than for 
the livestock side of agriculture. And how much different they are will 
depend partly on national policy regarding export of feedstuffs. 
With regard to crops, we can keep production high if we want to. "Want-
ing to" includes allocating fuel and ingredients for fertilizer and any other 
inputs of industrial origin that threaten to become short in supply. It also 
includes adequate price guarantees, to protect against excessive market 
weakness. 
Livestock and poultry enterprises present a different picture. Yet they 
are an important part of agriculture. They contribute a sizable part of 
total farm income -- though official data exaggerate the amount operating 
farmers receive. The published figures include the income going to integrators 
and to nonfarm investors in feedlot operations. Meat and poultry products are 
also high on the scale of consumer touchiness. Public policy for agriculture 
and farm programs, including export policy for feedstuffs, will be affected 
by how consumers feel about the supply and price of meat and poultry. 
The reasons I am somewhat apprehensive about future levels of livestock 
production are the following: 
(1) The tendency of many crop-and-livestock farmers to avoid labor 
intensive enterprises such as hogs and dairy cattle. As noted above, improved 
incomes of recent years have made it easier for them to indulge their 
preferences. 
(2) with respect to beef cattle, so important in farm income, a tight-
ness in supply of low-cost resources. No more cheap grazing land is avail-
able. Except to the extent new programs free a little previously-idled land 
for grazing, all increases in beef cattle production (separate from feeding) 
will have to come from diverting resources from other enterprises. This would 
be a very costly expansion, and therefore a slow one. 
Much of past expansion in beef herds came as a replacement to other 
roughage-consuming species of livestock. Significantly, total livestock 
numbers in the U. S. as measured by their roughage requirements have not in-
creased much. Roughage consuming livestock now total about 100 million units. 
This is up only a little from the 96 million of 1963, the 99 million of 1943, 
or even the 92 million of 1933 -- and the 1933 figure was scarcely different 
from the peak years of World War I. (See chart.) 
In other words, on a national basis the expansion of beef cow herds over 
time has been accounted for not by growth in forage capacity but by success-
ive diversions from horses and mules, then ~heep, then milk cows. The chart 
shows how dramatic that diversion has been. 
It is unlikely that any of these species will decline much further, 
thereby graciously making room for more beef cows. The best hope for expand-
2units of horses and mules are now 19 million below their one-time peak, 
and sheep units are 6 million below their high mark. units of dairy cattle 
have declined at least 20 million from their wartime high. 
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ROUGHAGE-CONSUMING ANIMAL UNITS OF LIVESTOCK ON FARMS 
ing beef cattle production would be to induce beef cows to drop twin calves. 
Research for multiple births is underway. 
(3) Uncertainty as to how much concentrate feed will go into domestic 
feeding. Past increases in total livestock and poultry production have 
depended heavily on concentrate feed, not roughages. It is in concentrate 
feed production that we have shown our marvelous productivity. I expressed 
above my confidence that we will continue to turn out vast quantities of corn 
and soybeans. 
But corn and beans do not convert automatically into pork, beef and eggs. 
Recently foreign countries have shown themselves ready, willing and able to 
buy concentrate feedstuffs out from under the noses of our own livestock and 
poultry men. Furthermore, the unwillingness of our government to continue a 
policy of storage and stabilization for feedstuffs discourages domestic live-
stock production and encourages exports. 
Hence we have the interesting if alarming spectacle that our government 
must consider whether, despite the urgent need to earn foreign exchange, it 
should restrict exports of feedstuffs in order to sustain livestock and 
poultry production at home and thereby keep consumers from exploding in 
protest against what they regard as excessively high prices of meat, milk and 
eggs. 
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Equally interesting, if not equally alarming, is the possibility that a 
trading relationship in feed and livestock products will emerge between the 
U. S. and Europe similar to that which now exists in metals and finished metal 
products between the U. S. and Japan. Will we ship our feeds to Europe and 
buy back dairy products, and perhaps even some meat and poultry items? 
But even this is not the whole story. Poorer nations also want our 
grains; and they use them directly as human food. They pay for some shipments, 
and ask long term credits on others. In a humanitarian sense, it is note-
worthy that a bushel of grain will feed several times more human beings 
directly than when converted via livestock. 
Policy for food exports, whether to developed or less developed nations, 
remains deep in diplomacy. The Federation of American Scientists has declared 
that inasmuch as this is true, "we have an obligation to handle it diplomati-
cally. All-out stop and go policies -- in which uncontrolled open markets 
alternate with embargoes -- become inappropriate •••• "3 
Meaning to structure of Agriculture 
If commercial family farmers continue to shift out of livestock to cash 
grain, the door will be left wide open for an expansion of factory-type 
operations. separating feed and livestock production further would have a 
great deal of meaning to the future structure of agriculture. 
It should be noted, however, that other factors also are contributing to 
such a change in structure. I have in mind the income tax regulations that 
give high-income nonfarmers a competitive advantage over farmer feeders of 
cattle. This, however, is a separate subject deserving separate discussion. 4 
Demand and pricing Situation 
The analysis thus far has not considered the demand side of the supply-
demand equation. Demand will continue to wield a great deal of influence, but 
we must be careful how we look at it. 
Economists need to keep their tools up to date. Those of us born and 
reared in the tradition of economic recession are all too prone to couch our 
fears in terms of the old pattern of an industrial recession accompanied by 
loss of consumer income and by price deflation. 
That was the story of the Great Depression of the 1930's and the little 
replicas we have seen since. 
It is probably not the prototype for the hazards that we face now. 
In my judgment very serious perils lie in our national future. Their 
.. physical base is an increasing shortage of natural resources, combined with 
the cost of shielding our environment from the damage wrought by careless 
resource use in the past. This will be exacerbated by the highly unequal dis-
tribution of wealth and income in our country. It is one of the oldest of 
proverbs that inequitable distribution of wealth is not too hard to live with 
so long as more wealth can be created. When everyone's lot is improving we 
don't worry too much about relative rates of improvement. But if our national 
wealth and income level out, the distribution of that wealth begins to bear 
on economic and social stability. 
Ironically, if such a situation materializes it will be made worse if we 
insist on applying tools that were shaped for another time and different 
3 F.A.S. Newsletter, vol. 26, no. 7, Sept. 1973, p. 2. 
4For a summary review see my "Investment in Farming, Income Tax Rules, 
and Who will Control," Economic and Marketing Information for Missouri Agri-
culture, Oct. 1973. 
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circumstances. More specifically, the more I reflect on the economic 
philosophies of our age in history the more convinced I am that they can be 
summed as a deep and abiding faith in the efficaciousness of the fiscal device 
of generation of income. The connotation of the world "faith" reminds of an 
apt parallel with religion, for just as religious leaders preach that human 
comity must rest on human integrity, even so economists teach that economic 
strength is rooted in real productiveness and not in fiscal manipulation. 
Confidence that dollar income will cure everything is equally held 
privately and publicly. Although every man-jack (and woman-jill) of us profess-
es otherwise, we all glory in advances in our money income and wealth. 
Individually, we like to see our salaries raised each year and have come to 
regard an annual boost as a kind of inherent right. Furthermore, we exult in 
gains in value of our holdings in common stock or houses or land. When stock 
values seemed to turn faithless the shift was to farmland and to commodity 
futures. 
The next level of private action is that of aggregations of much size and 
power. If a big business or a labor union or an organization of civil service 
retirees or a farm bargaining association finds itself pressed to sustain its 
place in the economic sun it thereupon seeks to raise the prices and incomes 
it receives. This is the natural behavior of monopoly but many less-than-
monopolistic organizations try to follow the same pattern. 
Central governments have been leading exponents of the spending principle. 
During the Great Depression and in every little recession since, the practice 
has been to spend ourselves into recovery. Policies have been undertaken to 
bribe the rich into investing their idle funds, to induce the middle classes 
to borrow cheap money to build new homes, and even to grant the poor a pittance 
in welfare payments and food packages or stamps. At the same time government 
itself has deficit-spent for a variety of purposes. 
Underlying the philosophy and the practice is the vitally important 
premise that our national resources are ample but insufficient demand has 
caused them to be idle. The philosophy and practices were appropriate so long 
as the premise held. They were appropriate so long as we actually had un-
developed resources at hand, waiting to be employed. 
The premise no longer holds. We are no longer wealthy with unused 
resources. We are not basking in the reflection of our superior productivity. 
Indeed, we have been shocked into admitting that other nations are productive 
too and even able to outperform us in many ways: our psychic slip is showing. 
We probably will continue to try to force-feed the economy, thereby creat-
ing some genuine prosperity but a big dose of make-believe. And because of the 
power lodged in various parts of the economy and the commitment to keeping 
incomes of large sectors moving upward alongside the cost of living, we have 
got ourselves into an almost irreversible inflationary situation. I don't 
know of any man wise enough to offer a satisfactory solution or predict the 
eventual outcome. 
In my judgment the "demand" situation in years ahead will be defined not 
so much by the level of income as such as by the fiscal measures taken to cope 
with the conflicting forces of inflationary pressures and sluggish production. 
It seems highly likely that agriculture will be caught right in the middle, as 
indeed it has been for two or three years. If my analysis is correct we can 
expect a succession of production incentives and disincentives, price controls 
and decontrols, export restrictions and export encouragements -- all in a 
confusing and unpredictable pattern. In my judgment, promises that farm 
product markets will soon return to a deregulated "normal" are false as sugar 
plum fairies. It is not that such an outcome will not be earnestly sought, but 
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rather that a sequence of "temporary" circumstances will intervene. 
Foreign Demand 
In the account thus far I have skirted the topic of export demand for 
U. S. farm products except to suggest that demand for feedstuffs will be 
strong. 
The U. S. Department of Agriculture has made several projections of 
export demand, and I would not try to improve on them. One could warn that 
the immediate surge in that demand, based largely on 1972 crop failures in 
the Soviet Union and elsewhere, could readily tempt into an overstatement of 
future trends. On the other hand, the surplus of dollars in foreign hands is 
a positive factor. And even though Europe and Japan will be more worried 
about petroleum than farm products, those dollars won't do them much good in 
buying oil. 
More likely, I believe, is that our future farm exports will be caught 
up in policy decisions including those about international monetary exchange 
and trade agreements. Further, if the domestic scene will be as turbulent as 
I forecast, export and import controls will be among the devices wielded in 
desperate attempts to solve our vexing problems. I do not believe foreign 
demand for farm products will be an independent factor in the future economic 
scene. 
A Sum-up 
The overall tone of the argument presented here is that U. s. agriculture 
will not suddenly resume such an outpouring of crop and livestock products as 
to overwhelm U. s. and world markets. There will be too many restraining 
factors for that to happen. Henceforth, surpluses will be episodic, not 
continuous. And they are more likely to show up in crop products than live-
stock. 
The product most likely to continue in relatively short supply is beef. 
Unless we can tempt the old cow into dropping twin calves regularly I believe 
the limitation in supply of cheap roughage for that lazy boarder will arrest 
any rapid expansion. 
In no sense, however, does this mean that 1973 levels of prices of wheat, 
corn, soybeans, hogs and beef cattle will be sustained in future years. On 
both the supply and demand side 1973 has been truly exceptional. Consumers 
will not continue to spend the kind of money for food that they have spent. 
Farmers will not always get the 43 percent of the consumer's food dollar that 
they got in the first quarter of 1973 (compared with 38-40 percent a few years 
ago). Supplies of farm products will not stay as short as in recent months. 
A price adjustment lies ahead. Like every such correction to a temporarily 
heady situation, it will be painful. 
Central to my judgment that supply will nevertheless not be terribly 
burdensome or prices distressingly low is the prospect that industrial 
resources used in agriculture will not be as super-plentiful in the future as 
the past. Petroleum and chemical fertilizer are the prime candidates for 
relative shortages. 
Yet when all else has been said, the future supply, demand, and price 
situation in agriculture will depend to large extent on what action is taken 
regarding it. It depends on what is done about assuring allocation of 
essential fuel and other materials. It depends on what is done by means of 
research and extension to help farmers adjust to a changing pattern of input 
supplies and costs. It depends on whether it will be national policy to 
undergird farmers' incomes as they expand their output, and to stabilize 
38 
supplies and prices of feed via a wise reserve policy. It depends also on 
what our policy will be regarding ex ports of food and feed to other nations. 
But the supply, demand, and price situation in agriculture in the future 
will depend also on whether income of the consuming population is sustained by 
putting people to productive work, or by fiscal measures to sustain dollar 
income -- or, as a third and potentially devastating alternative, by turning 
the screws down tight, accepting widespread unemployment, and letting the low 
income third of the nation scrounge. This third alternative would amount to 
a literal and faithful application of the Keynesian doctrine, holding on to 
it after it had passed its usefulness. Applied rigorously, it would cure all 
inflation including that in prices of farm products. It would put us right 
back into the situation of land held idle by government edict and people kept 
idle by government indifference. In a nation frustrated and frightened and 
in danger of drifting into political reactionism, this is a genuine possibility. 
39 
THE TOPICS AND THE SETTING FOR MAKING 
FARM POLl CY IN THE YEARS AHEAD 
J. Carroll Bottum, professor-Emeritus, Purdue university 
We have had an open, realistic, interesting conference representing a 
cross section of agricultural thinking. As a result we have had many differ-
ent thoughts expressed about agricultural policy. This has occurred not only 
because we differ on what we perceive as the situation and the solution, but 
also because we differ on the kind of society we are striving for, or our 
goals. 
Bishop Gruka of Gary once said to me, "I can call in two physicians when 
a man is sick. In a relatively short time they will agree what should be 
done because they understand how a normal body should function. If I ask the 
same two men what we should do about a public problem, they are immediately in 
an argument because they differ on how a normal society should function." So, 
part of our differences arise over our perception of the kind of society we 
want. 
Individuals are placed on this earth with widely varying levels of 
productivity. This occurs from variations in environment and in genetic 
inheritance. 
At the same time individuals in our society have a strong sense of equity. 
But we have learned from experiences in the world that if each individual re-
ceives equal returns, productivity of the group tends to fall to the level of 
the least productive. Then all have less. Therefore, a free society is 
always seeking that combination between rewarding the productive and obtain-
ing equity which satisfies society at any given time. It is basically an un-
solvable problem as long as man is as he is. 
Mankind in all history has only found five economic systems for dealing 
with this problem: 
I Dictatorship, where an individual or small group decides what will be 
produced and how and to whom it will be distributed. 
2 - Caste or Status Quo System - This works where little technical change 
occurs, as in India years ago. 
3 Anarchism - This has never lasted long but has existed for short 
periods. 
4 Democratic Socialism - Government officials are elected but the 
government owns the resources and makes the decisions. 
5 - Free choice or free enterprise system - The individual makes the 
decision of what he will produce and what he will buy. 
Of course, we have a combination of 4 and 5. It is interesting to note 
that no free society has ever existed in the world for any length of time that 
was completely socialized or that was completely free enterprise. 
In the 1960's we surveyed the thinking of representative samples of farm-
ers in 12 states. We tried to get their attitudes and values. In essence we 
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found that from 15 to 20 percent believed we should control agricultural out-
put and set farm prices. They understood and accepted this approach for other 
segments of society. At the other end of the scale were 20 to 25 percent of 
the farmers who believed in free prices. They understood the consequences of 
free prices and believed in them for other segments of society. This left 55 
to 60 percent who were not too clear in their perception and who tended to 
swing towards controls in times of low prices and towards free prices when 
farm prices were higher. I have found this helps pOliticians to understand 
the kind of an issue they are dealing with in farm income policy. 
In recent years it has been somewhat our policy that if the free enter-
prise approach was not meeting our social criteria, we socialize it. In a 
number of areas this has not worked out as well as was hoped. Thus, there is 
a growing school of thought that we need to modify our institutions that are 
not performing as we desire, in ways that will keep some degree of 
competition in them. I think this concept is particularly important in the 
agricultural area and offers a challenge to agriculture. 
Against this backdrop let me now turn more specifically to agricultural 
policy. 
As I have listened at this conference, I think we might agree that our 
goals in agricultural policy are: (1) an adequate farm income, (2) maintain-
ing the decision making on the independent farm, and (3) obtaining and main-
taining adequate community services. Regarding the third goal, we would of 
course have differences on what level of services was adequate and how they 
should be maintained. 
From the late twenties to the early forties, both Democrats and 
Republicans from the South and Mid-west joined up to form a so-called agri-
cultural bloc. They, with some support from the West, had the muscle to pass 
farm legislation which they originated. If a congressman in any district 
would not go along, there were enough farm votes in his district so that if 
a farm leader went out and held a meeting in the congressman's district, the 
leader could put on some pressure. 
NOw, the farm population has declined to the point where agriculture, to 
a greater degree, must operate more as a minority group. The further expansion 
of government into new areas has involved agriculture in many national programs 
not arising in agriculture. It has reached the stage where some people are 
saying that the legislative agenda for agriculture is being largely set by 
people outside of agriculture. They point to such issues as environmental 
protection, energy and land use as examples. 
In any event, agricultural legislation is going to have to appear credit-
able to the non-farm groups in the future. Agriculture no longer has the 
political muscle to pass just what it wants, and others will continue to put 
legislation on the agricultural agenda. 
This does not mean that agriculture will be treated any less favorably. 
In England and Germany, where the rural population has been relatively small 
compared to the total population, this has not been true. I once put this 
question to a leader of the largest farm o~ganization in England. He said, 
"We have been treated better than before there became so few of us to be 
helped in time of economic trouble." 
There is a greater recognition in Congress that no group should be unduly 
discriminated against economically. This is likely to continue. It offsets, 
to some degree, the decreased political muscle of agriculture. 
There still is a reservoir of good will toward farmers. Many people in 
our cities are still first and second generation farmers. There are many who 
know the farmer battles nature, that many farmers still work long hours, and 
that agriculture is an efficient industry. 
Farmers, however, on various issues may have to seek political allies 
more than in the past. These allies may be different on different issues. 
NOw, let us turn to some of the political issues affecting agriculture 
in the years ahead. 
with average weather the world has the capacity to produce more wheat and 
feed grains than the commercial market will take at u. S. farm program target 
levels. Therefore, for certain years at least the farm income program will 
continue to be an issue. Such issues as, how figure the conservation reservoir? 
should we pasture set-aside acres? and should livestock enterprises be support-
ed as are crops? -- these will come to the front at various times, as will other 
issues involving the farm program. 
If we are going to be a heavy supplier of grain to the world, the question 
arises of what reserve stock should be maintained. This raises the question 
of what organization should do it and how it should be handled if we do main-
tain a reserve. If we are going to hold our share of the world markets, the 
importing countries are going to insist that we be prepared to meet their 
continuing needs, and not just sell when we have a surplus. 
Legislation bearing on who is going to control agriculture will be a 
continuing issue during the next decade or two. This legislation will deal 
particularly with the maintenance of open markets and with federal income tax 
policies affecting the distribution of income and resources in agriculture. 
It also must provide for agriculture's having continual access to the central 
money markets and for the maintenance of public knowledge in the agricultural 
area. 
Rural development will be a continuing issue. There are many valid reasons 
for not continuing to shift more and more of our rural population to the larger 
cities. 
Some of the issues that will be kept on the agricultural legislative 
agenda by non-agricultural forces are: environmental issues, energy, land use, 
taxation, inflation, and many others some of which cannot be anticipated. 
When we have been neglectful of an area we tended once, we do not re-
acquire competency readily. There is a certain amount of fadism developed in 
the media. In the trade-offs between the environmentalists and the resource 
users, for example, the environmentalists carry society beyond what it will 
accept over time. Soil conservation and now clean air and water are examples 
in point. We then have to work out the practical compromises and the trade-
offs. 
The energy issue will probably go through the same stages. It will 
affect agriculture even though we only use in agricultural production 3 per-
cent of the petroleum consumed in the united States. 
Summary 
The political framework for agricultural policy making has changed during 
the past three decades. The opportunity for agriculture is no less, but the 
approach used now must recognize more fully the national implications of such 
legislation. Likewise, agricultural policy makers must be prepared to accept 
more of the agricultural legislation being put on ·the agenda by non-farm 
groups. 
Let us vigorously argue our viewpoints and then work out the best compro-
mise. You may not get all you want, but let me say to you that there are a 
lot of farmers around the world who would like a chance to be a U. S. farmer. 
I have seen them and talked to them. 
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